(CaptainMidnight's original statements in black. Lustylad's replies in blue. CaptainMidnight's answers in red.)
Although I'm not sure anything that could be credibly described as even slightly revenue-negative would ever fly, I am in agreement with you on the basic principles here. In my view, simplification, loophole-closing, and base-broadening should be hallmarks of any good tax reform.
I added "slightly revenue-negative" because we can never be 100% accurate in forecasting the actual impact and I would prefer to err on the revenue-negative side. Harry Reid killed any chances of tax reform during Obama's second term when he explicitly rejected the goal of keeping it revenue-neutral. Like all big-spending liberals, he wants to turn “reform” into a huge new revenue grab. That's something we need to avoid at all costs.
Not only did Obama, Reid, and other Democrats hunger for new revenue, their idea of "reform" has pretty much been limited to jacking up rates on top-bracket taxpayers as much as possible. Never mind the obvious fact that much of the anticipated additional revenue from such measures (especially from the capital gains tax) tends to pull a disappearing act.
That was the basic guiding principle in the discussions leading up to the 1986 tax reform. However, at the time, people didn't realize the severity of the adverse consequences arising from jettisoning the pre-1986 code in one fell swoop. The problem was that the value of hundreds of billions of dollars of commercial real estate was drastically reduced by the elimination of a taxpayer's ability to deduct depreciation on highly-leveraged assets, which of course was incentivized by 50% tax rates. Countless S&Ls went bankrupt and every big bank in Texas, save one, went spectacularly bust. That problem occurred to a lesser degree in various places around the country, but was much worse in Texas owing to the early '80s construction boom in cities like Dallas and Houston.
That's an interesting take on what happened during the 1980s. I agree the 1986 tax reform had a negative impact on commercial real estate values, but I wouldn't blame it for the entire S&L crisis. Prior to the 1986 reforms, sale-leasebacks of office buildings were very popular – afterwards such transactions dried up when the tax benefits to limited partnerships were rescinded. But I think the Texas bust owed as much to the crash in oil prices (from $35 a barrel in 1980 to under $10 in 1986) as it did to tax reform. Also, many S&Ls in the early 1980s were crippled by asset-liability mismatches. Deregulation was supposed to correct this problem – but it eventually opened the door to other problems as some of the thrifts loaded up on Michael Milken's junk bonds and loaned recklessly to local developers and cronies. I really respected the guy who came in and cleaned up the mess – Bill Seidman. He ran the Resolution Trust Corporation with competence and professionalism. We need more people like him these days.
I do not think the Texas bank and S&L bust was caused solely by collapsing real estate valuations, and that energy was certainly a significant contributing factor. It was sort of like a "perfect storm" with one whammy followed quickly by another. Institutions weakened by the 1985-86 oil price plunge were simply slaughtered by the post-1986 real estate debacle, for the real estate loan portfolio numbers were so much larger.
Although a number of office building sale-leasebacks obviously went sour, the really big dollars went into limited partnerships created and sold to countless small investors. High inflation of the 1970s pushed large numbers of high-income professionals into the top tax bracket, so they were incentivized to get into some sort of tax shelter since the top marginal tax rate was so high back then. (It had long been possible for wealthy investors to avoid paying anything remotely close to the top statutory rate.) IRS rules at the time allowed capital contributions to be structured such that the LP investor got a "2:1 write-off." Often the capital contributions were stretched out into equal installments over, say, five years. Then, assuming the investor was in the 50% bracket, he could reduce his tax bill to an amount equaling the capital call, and in essence get his partnership interest "for free!" It's obviously not difficult to see how this idea could be appealing to many people.
A large and growing number of apartment complexes, office buildings, and shopping centers were chased by tax-motivated partnerships, and prices skyrocketed. Post-1986, of course, it all came unwound, once it became so painfully apparent that such a large portion of real estate appreciation over the previous decade was attributable to tax-related considerations.
And, yes, I do believe we need more people like the late Bill Seidman today!
However, that situation no longer exists, and I know of no serious adverse consequences likely to arise from any similar sort of reform.
Well, you may not forsee them but there are always unintended consequences. Besides, I am certain most of the industries that stand to lose their tax breaks (real estate, renewable energy, charities, private equity managers, to name a few) will scream loudly about the terrible consequences of reform well before anything is passed or implemented.
True that!
Another key feature of good tax reform, in my view, would be the overhaul (or preferably elimination) of the corporate income tax. A lot of progressives would demagogue this as a "giveaway" to the rich, but that's misguided and based on a misunderstanding of the corporate tax incidence.
I agree on both points – we need a lower corporate rate, and the liberals will demagogue against it. They will use two additional arguments. First, they will say the high nominal rate is meaningless because most corporations actually pay a lower effective rate. Second, they will argue that corporations today pay a lower share of total federal taxes (around 11%) than they used to. You will need to smash all of those arguments with strong counter-points about the economic benefits of lowering the corporate rate.
I think there are some very good counter-arguments here, but the problem is that most voters have no idea how the corporate tax system works, so efforts aimed at meaningful reform are easy for demagogues to chew into.
First, it clearly is the case that most large corporations pay an effective rate that's far, far below the statutory rate. And the larger (and more international) the player, the lower is likely to be the effective rate. I think this is the main reason that very large corporations don't see the corporate tax code as that much of a problem, since they find it much easier to game than their smaller and intermediate-sized potential competitors. Smaller players can't maneuver to reduce their corporate tax liability so easily, let alone engage in inversions and other dodges, so they are at a clear competitive disadvantage relative to the behemoths in an industry. This is why one observer opined last year that the corporate tax code is just another "crony capitalist shuffle." (I think he's exactly right.)
Another problem is inversions and the related practice of "earnings-stripping." The latter involves arranging loans between subsidiaries located in different tax jurisdictions with widely differing tax rates. For instance, one subsidiary in a high-tax jurisdiction (like the U.S.) borrows huge sums from another in a "tax-friendlier" place and streams tax-deductible payments to it. How can stuff like this possibly not have adverse consequences for the U.S. economy?
Robert Barro suggested a couple of years ago that the corporate tax should be eliminated and replaced with a consumption tax that would produce less deadweight loss to the economy. That's actually a similar notion to the proposals offered by Rand Paul and Ted Cruz. However, many conservatives vehemently oppose the idea on the basis that it hands a new, very large revenue tool to big-spending politicians who would just start pushing the rate higher and higher, like they've been doing in Europe for decades with the VAT. The "camel's nose into the tent" metaphor has been used by a few people when writing about this. It looks to me, though, like the Cruz and Paul tax rates are much, much too low to make the proposals anywhere near revenue-neutral. I think a key question here is what marginal tax rate you could sell to voters without making it too easy for progressives to paint the plan as a "giveaway to the rich." Although loopholes today are nowhere near as juicy as they were 30 years ago, I still think there's a good case to be made for having some rate-lowering accompany loophole-closing. In fact, the bipartisan Simpson-Bowles commission did just that a few years back. Now someone needs to do it again. Maybe that's a heavy lift in today's hyper-polarized political environment, but I don't see why it couldn't be doable if presented properly.
I am also very suspicious of the idea of a new consumption tax. Would it be “invisible” to consumers and embedded in the prices we pay for everything? We already pay sales taxes at the state level – why add to them? Roughly 70% of our GDP is generated by consumption – why slow down the growth engine? Do we really want to follow the Europeans down their VAT-paved road to slow-growth hell? And yeah, it would hand every spendthrift politician out there a brand new revenue gusher. So it would be an uphill battle to persuade me to support such a tax.
The tax proposals of some of the candidates running for President are as irresponsible and extreme as their authors. Trump would blow up the deficit the most on the GOP side, and Sanders wins the prize on the Democratic side. Trump would blow it up with tax cuts, Bernie by opening up the spending floodgates. Pick your poison. If either is elected, we can only hope Congress will act like a wet blanket. Here's a story from yesterday's NYT about Bernie the Free-Spending Socialist. Even left-wing economists think he's nuts. He would take federal spending from $4 trillion to $6 trillion a year in a heartbeat. If you think Obamacare is a disaster, wait until Bernie rolls out single-payer:
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/16/us...rss-plans.html
As for Trump, here is a WSJ opinion piece from last year when he first rolled out his tax plan. Even using dynamic scoring, the Tax Foundation estimates it would add $1 trillion a year to the deficit:
http://www.wsj.com/articles/a-trumpi...orm-1443657274
Although I do believe that a consumption tax is in many respects less harmful to the economy than most other taxes, I share your concern about handing a shiny new revenue machine to big-spending politicians. Several conservative and libertarian economists have spoken to this issue recently while voicing concerns about the proposals offered by Rand Paul and Ted Cruz.
Several people I know, and whose opinions I respect, have suggested that it's extremely likely we're headed toward a consumption tax within the next decade, and the best we can hope for is that it's coupled with something like a simplified flat income tax, or at least one with no more than a couple of brackets -- and that it, hopefully, swaps loophole-closing for at least some rate-lowering.
Barro suggested that a well-designed 10% consumption tax could raise about 5% of GDP, and that's enough to cover the corporate income tax plus finance quite a bit of personal income tax rate-lowering as well.
My own preference is for some kind of modified Simpson-Bowles reform swapping rate-lowering for loophole-closing. I need to be convinced on the merits of a new consumption tax. 5% of GDP is about $900 billion. Corporate income taxes currently bring in roughly half that amount.
That may reasonably beg the question of how you prevent future progressives from jacking up the rate. But then, how do you prevent that with
any tax, whether on income or consumption?
The more tax spigots are available, the easier it is for the fuckers to turn one on without everyone noticing. We need a Constitutional amendment to put a lid on federal taxes. Something akin to a national version of California's Proposition 8, except it would cap ALL taxes, not just property taxes. I don't know why Grover Norquist hasn't pursued something along those lines.
I don't doubt for a minute that Grover Norquist would love such a constitutional amendment more than almost anything. But I doubt that the probability of that occurring is any greater than that of repealing the Sixteenth Amendment.
In other words, absolute zero.