You heard it? Do you have voices in your head? maybe you should get some help with that.
Do you actually doubt that the printer ID'ing on media is a real thing?
Originally Posted by texassapper
Too bad ballot printing is heavily regulated.
Basic Issues
In systems where ballots are accountable items, strict security and controls must surround ballot paper printing. If ballot authenticity is provided by the use of special papers, paper stocks must also be strictly controlled. As ballot paper printing is a high volume, short turnaround time process that demands total print accuracy, the electoral management body must have total confidence in the capacity, quality control procedures, integrity, and security of ballot paper printing contractors. It is a process in which the electoral management body should also institute its own strict quality control mechanisms.
Where enveloped ballot voting procedures are used, such as in those following the French system, ballots are freely available to voters. While accuracy of ballot content is still an important issue, there is no need for the same levels of integrity and security controls as where 'mark choice' ballots are used.
Printing Location
When determining the design of ballots, consideration must be given to both the time they will take to print and whether potential contractors are capable of meeting the print specifications. Some types of ballots with special features, may be restricted in potential production facilities, or not be able to be produced locally, either through lack of technology required or lack of capacity to complete the task within the available time frame. This may include, for example:
using watermarked or other special papers
security print methods
producing in a booklet with numbered stubs
using full colour print and/or colour photographs of candidates
Production of ballots using these more expensive methods can add significantly to election costs. Additionally, foreign production will make it more difficult to control quality and supply scheduling for the most important item of election material. Lead times will be longer, unless very expensive transport methods are adopted. Decisions to print in another country should only be made after very careful consideration of locally produced alternatives.
Due to the high volumes and short time period usually available for ballot printing, it can be more appropriate to contract ballot paper printing at the regional level, if suitable contractors are available. Contracting to multiple contractors at local levels is generally not sustainable--quality control and standardisation of product can too easily be compromised.
Print Scheduling
Print scheduling will depend on factors such as how soon various ballots are required for use by voters. If full detail ballots are required for early voting, or to send to voting stations in other countries, there may be some urgency to produce small initial quantities of ballots for all electoral districts.
Conversely, where write-in ballots (which can be produced earlier) are used for early or absentee voting, central or regional production facilities would usually start printing with the electoral districts at the furthest distance and with the longest transport lead time, to enable packaging of ballots, with their voting stations' other supplies, to begin first.
Print Quality Control
Intensive quality control measures need to be applied by both the electoral management body and the print contractor to ensure that ballots are correctly printed. Transfer of ballot format and content data electronically from the electoral management body to the print contractor can assist in ensuring accurate printing. All ballot printing needs to be undertaken in line with strict control instructions, covering authorisations to print and transfer material, quantities, content, security, and distribution (see Ballot Paper Printing Instructions - Canada).
For each ballot printed (for different electoral districts, different types of voting, or different elections), the quality control measures that need to be implemented would include the following initial checks:
provision of detailed design specifications to the contractor, and ensuring that these have been fully understood--mock-up proofs obtained from the contractor and thoroughly checked;
detailed checking of ballot content material before it is sent to the contractor for print set-up--checking party/candidate order against the order announced following the close of nominations; checking the correctness of all party/candidate details required on the ballot against the information provided on accepted nominations forms;
checking and signing off of all contractor-produced film and plate reproduction material, by electoral management body staff, before production proofs are printed.
During print production, the following checks need to be implemented:
An experienced electoral management body staff member should be present during the make-ready process for the press, and check the format, information, colour, image position, and trim of the ballot. Only when proofs have been approved by the electoral management body as correct should production printing commence.
During printing, there should be a regular extraction of sample ballots for checking as to colour, image position, and trim. If any deficiencies are found, printing should cease until a fresh satisfactory proof has been printed and approved by the electoral management body. Stocks of ballots produced since the last accepted sample should be checked and faulty ballots destroyed.
These control processes should be repeated whenever a new plate is used, a different press brought into production or print of a different ballot is about to commence.
Where ballots are being produced in numbered stub booklets, or other standard packages, samples of the final product should also be checked to ensure stubs are numbered correctly in sequence and/or packs contain the correct number of ballots.
This may seem tedious, but the consequences of incorrect ballot format, party or candidate order or data, trimming of ballots (so candidate/party names, or ballot completion instructions are deleted), or colour (particularly for colour print ballots containing candidate photographs or party symbols) can be serious enough to jeopardise the election.
Security
In systems where ballots are accountable materials, security measures to be applied during printing would include:
an undertaking to be made by the contractor regarding security of ballot materials;
secure, weatherproof storage by the print contractor of all printed ballots, ballot paper stock, printing plates and other ballot reproduction material;
physical security in the printing plant, including searches of employees leaving the premises;
secure return of all printing plates and reproduction material to the electoral management body for secure destruction at the conclusion if the print run.
Where special paper stock is used as an integrity control, security would also be required, including:
secure storage of ballot paper stock on the print contractor's premises;
contractor's accounting for and secure destruction of all off-cut and waste paper stock and printing spoils;
contractor's accounting for all paper stock supplied but not used.
