Thanks man, for parroting Liz Warren's new talking point. Now can you do everyone a favor and cite the specific Dodd-Frank provision that would have prevented the collapse of SVB, had it not been relaxed?
Fauxcahontas couldn't.
Originally Posted by lustylad
In 2019 the Federal Reserve compounded the pullback from Dodd-Frank by instituting new rules that eliminated liquidity requirements entirely for banks with assets under $250 billion and softened other regulations.
SVB’s deposits surged from $50 billion in 2018 to $220 billion in early 2022, it remained conveniently below the new standard that would have triggered more oversight and higher capital-adequacy requirements.
Originally Posted by royamcr
Thanks man, that sounds like a pretty intelligent comment. Are those your own thoughts?
You do know that if/when you're quoting someone else, the proper thing to do is to put the comment in quote marks, right? I mean, you wouldn't want to mislead anyone into thinking someone else's thoughts are your own, would you? That would be plagiarism. And if you got caught plagiarizing, you would look highly dishonest. Your credibility as an eccie poster could be irreparably damaged.
Oops! Look what I found... from the WSJ dated 3/14/23, an opinion piece by William Galston.
Looks like you lifted those two sentences verbatim from the Galston article, didn't you? (Verbatim means word for word, no paraphrasing.) I even highlighted them for you.
How Silicon Valley Bank Avoided Oversight
Before the collapse, its CEO lobbied for a loosening of Dodd-Frank reforms, risking financial stability.
By William A. Galston
March 14, 2023 1:22 pm ET
Martin Gruenberg, chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., delivered remarks March 6 on the state of the banking system to the Institute of International Bankers. He reiterated his long-held view that the regime of high and rising interest rates would impair banks’ longer-term-maturity assets, pointing out that rate increases had already reduced the value of these assets by $620 billion. He warned that these unrealized losses “weaken a bank’s future ability to meet unexpected liquidity needs.”
Silicon Valley Bank’s collapse four days later, followed swiftly by Signature Bank, another midsize financial firm, validated his concerns. (A smaller firm, Silvergate Capital Corp., had closed at midweek.) Depositors’ confidence in the soundness of these institutions evaporated, generating a classic bank run that led federal regulators to step in. (Disclosure: My son heads two venture-capital funds that have invested in startups with substantial deposits in SVB.) Over the weekend, regulators decided to guarantee depositors for the full amount of their accounts, though the formal FDIC guarantee is capped at $250,000 per depositor.
On one level, this is a saga of bad management. As deposits soared, SVB’s executives had invested in long-term assets without hedging adequately against interest-rate risks. And the firm lacked a diversified portfolio of depositors, most of whom came from the venture-capital sector. As the sector came under increasing pressure, its members tried to withdraw their funds simultaneously, and the bank couldn’t meet its obligations.
But there is a story behind this saga. After the financial collapse in 2008 and the ensuing Great Recession, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 to regulate the banking practices that had nearly plunged the world into a second global depression. Among other measures, Dodd-Frank imposed new reporting requirements on banks, toughened standards for capital adequacy, and restrained banks’ ability to use deposits for speculative investment. Banks with assets above $50 billion were deemed “systemically important” and subjected to especially strict scrutiny.
These standards brought greater stability to the sector, but also higher expenses and lower profits. Bank leaders weren’t pleased and soon began lobbying to mitigate the legislation’s impact on their operations. SVB’s CEO Greg Becker was an early objector who argued that subjecting his midsize bank to the full range of Dodd-Frank requirements “would stifle our ability to provide credit to our clients.”
The advocacy of Mr. Becker and other like-minded financiers bore fruit in 2018, when Congress enacted an amendment to Dodd-Frank that quintupled the threshold of systemic importance, from $50 billion to $250 billion.
Although SVB’s deposits surged from $50 billion in 2018 to $220 billion in early 2022, it remained conveniently below the new standard that would have triggered more oversight and higher capital-adequacy requirements.
In 2019 the Federal Reserve compounded the pullback from Dodd-Frank by instituting new rules that eliminated liquidity requirements entirely for banks with assets under $250 billion and softened other regulations. In a blunt dissent, then-Fed Gov. Lael Brainard, now the head of President Biden’s National Economic Council, stated that by going beyond the requirements of the 2018 amendments, the central bank was putting the future stability of the financial system at risk. She lost that battle, setting the stage for the recent collapse of three midsize firms and the possible threat to many others.
The federal government’s decision to guarantee uninsured deposits, which required a two-thirds vote of the boards of both the Fed and the FDIC, raises some difficult questions. Taking this step required federal officials to determine that the financial system faced a “systemic risk.” There is reason to wonder whether the collapse of a handful of midsize banks actually posed such a threat, though it is understandable that regulators were risk-averse. With the financial system already in a $620 billion hole, a contagion of fear could have spread across the system with catastrophic results.
Some observers fear that the decision to disregard the $250,000 cap on insured deposits could generate irresistible pressure to insure deposits fully regardless of the amount. This would undermine the purpose of the cap, which was to give large depositors an incentive to monitor the conduct of their banks and subject the system to market discipline. A total guarantee, many argue, is an invitation to irresponsibility. This may be right. On the other hand, it’s hard to see how forcing startups to assume the burden of due diligence promotes efficiency or economic growth, especially when the government is in a better position to handle it.
Not all regulations are “burdensome.” Some are essential to prevent bad things from happening, as in this case. Congress and the Fed should rethink their decision to exempt key parts of the financial system from the discipline of oversight.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-sil...bying-5b3ff837