The Russians will technically win and claim an occupation but it will be costly and ugly.
They don’t have the troops there sufficient to properly take either of the 5 major cities and hold it effected. Instead there will be a mess of bombardment to try to force the Ukrainians to fight in the open rather than from entrenched positions.
The Ukrainians will fight an insurgency for years but Ukraine sadly will technically fall as it will be bombarded to rubble.
Unless of course NATO gets drawn in somehow then the Russian troops in Ukraine will die horribly.
- 1blackman1
- 03-09-2022, 08:00 PM
- dilbert firestorm
- 03-09-2022, 11:55 PM
https://www.yahoo.com/news/russian-o...l?guccounter=1
The Daily Beast
Russian Officer Complains About Dead General and Comms Meltdown in Intercepted Call
Jamie Ross
Tue, March 8, 2022, 5:32 AM·3 min read
The Ukrainian defense ministry has released audio from a call that it claims captured two Russian officers lamenting the death of a top general and the collapse of its secure communications network in Ukraine.
In the call—which has been verified by Bellingcat, the fact-checking group known for exposing Kremlin misinformation—two purported Russian FSB officers are heard discussing the death of a general killed in fighting near Kharkiv, which has been hammered by shelling this month.
Ukraine’s defense ministry named the general as Vitaly Gerasimov, chief of staff of the 41st Army, and Bellingcat reported that it had confirmed the death with Russian sources. In its statement, Ukraine’s defense intelligence agency said Gerasimov had been “liquidated” alongside “a number of senior Russian army officers” in fighting near Kharkiv.
If Gerasimov’s death is confirmed, he would be the second Russian general to be killed in Ukraine within a week following the death of the 41st Army’s deputy commander, Andrei Sukhovetsky. A pro-Putin Chechnyan general, Magomed Tushayev, was also reported to have been killed.
Russia’s failure to protect its top-ranking officers backs up reports from Ukraine that the Kremlin’s invasion force is in disarray. On the call released by the Ukrainian defense ministry, one FSB officer can be heard complaining that its encrypted comms system had been destroyed, allowing Ukrainian forces to listen in on Russian military orders.
Bellingcat’s executive director, Christo Grozev, wrote, “In the phone call in which the FSB officer assigned to the 41st Army reports the death to his boss in Tula, he says they’ve lost all secure communications. Thus the phone call using a local sim card. Thus the intercept.”
https://twitter.com/christogrozev/st...64190965714946
Grozev went on: “His boss, who makes a looong pause when he hears the news of Gerassimov’s death (before swearing), is Dmitry Shevchenko, a senior FSB officer from Tula. We identified him by searching for his phone (published by Ukrainian military Intel) in open source lookup apps... In the call, you hear the Ukraine-based FSB officer ask his boss if he can talk via the secure Era system. The boss says Era is not working.”
Grozen reported that Russia’s crypto phones may no longer work in Kharkiv because Russian forces had destroyed surrounding cell phone towers, and Russia’s encrypted comms system operates using 3G or 4G.
The statement released by Ukraine’s military intelligence agency alluded to severe communications problems among Russian forces, saying, “The data obtained also indicate significant problems with communication in the occupier’s army and with the evacuation of their broken units.”
Russia has not commented on reports of Gerasimov’s death.
The Daily Beast
Russian Officer Complains About Dead General and Comms Meltdown in Intercepted Call
Jamie Ross
Tue, March 8, 2022, 5:32 AM·3 min read
The Ukrainian defense ministry has released audio from a call that it claims captured two Russian officers lamenting the death of a top general and the collapse of its secure communications network in Ukraine.
In the call—which has been verified by Bellingcat, the fact-checking group known for exposing Kremlin misinformation—two purported Russian FSB officers are heard discussing the death of a general killed in fighting near Kharkiv, which has been hammered by shelling this month.
Ukraine’s defense ministry named the general as Vitaly Gerasimov, chief of staff of the 41st Army, and Bellingcat reported that it had confirmed the death with Russian sources. In its statement, Ukraine’s defense intelligence agency said Gerasimov had been “liquidated” alongside “a number of senior Russian army officers” in fighting near Kharkiv.
If Gerasimov’s death is confirmed, he would be the second Russian general to be killed in Ukraine within a week following the death of the 41st Army’s deputy commander, Andrei Sukhovetsky. A pro-Putin Chechnyan general, Magomed Tushayev, was also reported to have been killed.
Russia’s failure to protect its top-ranking officers backs up reports from Ukraine that the Kremlin’s invasion force is in disarray. On the call released by the Ukrainian defense ministry, one FSB officer can be heard complaining that its encrypted comms system had been destroyed, allowing Ukrainian forces to listen in on Russian military orders.
Bellingcat’s executive director, Christo Grozev, wrote, “In the phone call in which the FSB officer assigned to the 41st Army reports the death to his boss in Tula, he says they’ve lost all secure communications. Thus the phone call using a local sim card. Thus the intercept.”
https://twitter.com/christogrozev/st...64190965714946
Grozev went on: “His boss, who makes a looong pause when he hears the news of Gerassimov’s death (before swearing), is Dmitry Shevchenko, a senior FSB officer from Tula. We identified him by searching for his phone (published by Ukrainian military Intel) in open source lookup apps... In the call, you hear the Ukraine-based FSB officer ask his boss if he can talk via the secure Era system. The boss says Era is not working.”
Grozen reported that Russia’s crypto phones may no longer work in Kharkiv because Russian forces had destroyed surrounding cell phone towers, and Russia’s encrypted comms system operates using 3G or 4G.
The statement released by Ukraine’s military intelligence agency alluded to severe communications problems among Russian forces, saying, “The data obtained also indicate significant problems with communication in the occupier’s army and with the evacuation of their broken units.”
Russia has not commented on reports of Gerasimov’s death.
- dilbert firestorm
- 03-10-2022, 12:01 AM
russian troops destroyed a cell tower and finding out you can't have secure communication on a cell phone because your troops destroyed a UKR cell tower.
now that is incompetence.
why is the russian army using cell phones when you're blowing up cell towers left and right???
now that is incompetence.
why is the russian army using cell phones when you're blowing up cell towers left and right???
- The_Waco_Kid
- 03-10-2022, 12:23 AM
russian troops destroyed a cell tower and finding out you can't have secure communication on a cell phone because your troops destroyed a UKR cell tower.
now that is incompetence.
why is the russian army using cell phones when you're blowing up cell towers left and right??? Originally Posted by dilbert firestorm
they should have their own radio system. wtf are these dummies thinking? cell phones? bahhahaaaaaa
- arañanegra
- 03-10-2022, 02:05 AM
If the American military was fighting against this group of Russian forces it may have already ended, I mean there is or was a 40 mile convoy or longer of Russian tanks, trucks and everything else lined up on one single stretch of road, it would have been like shooting fish in a barrel, these aren't battle tested Russian forces for the most part, geez, I almost feel sorry for them, Ukraine is kicking the shit out of them with low level weapons. "To the Russian battleship, go fook yourself", now there's a T-shirt.
- dilbert firestorm
- 03-11-2022, 04:21 AM
it appears that the russians are still using the grind it out soviet military doctrine which involves heavy use of artillery.
- dilbert firestorm
- 03-11-2022, 05:24 AM
https://www.realcleardefense.com/art...te_820732.html
Updated: Russian Occupation of Ukraine Troop-to-Task Estimate
By Ben Connable
March 09, 2022
<img alt="Updated: Russian Occupation of Ukraine Troop-to-Task Estimate"> (AP Photo/Vadim Ghirda)
In early February, I published a detailed forecast estimating the number of troops the Russians would have to deploy to successfully occupy part of Ukraine. In my notional scenario, I assumed the Russians would only advance as far as Kharkiv and the lower Dnieper river. Using military troop-to-task analysis, I estimated Russia would have to deploy 83,000 troops to secure that part of Ukraine and keep another 83,000 in constant rotation for a total of about 160,000 troops. That is just under half of the entire Russian army (the Russian Ground Force). In this article, I update the occupation troop-to-task assessment, accounting for President Putin's more ambitious invasion through Kyiv in the north and Odessa in the south.
This updated estimate is based on what I perceive to be four bare-minimum tasks the Russians will need to perform: (1) secure the perimeter of their occupied area from infiltration; (2) secure key nodes like power stations and communications centers in urban areas; (3) secure key roads and railways to keep open interior lines of communication; and (4) secure the population and conduct civil-military and counterinsurgency operations. Using a new, probable limit of advance just west of the Dnieper River and north of Odessa, I estimate that the Russians would need to deploy 168,000 occupation troops and keep another 168,000 in constant rotation for a total of 336,000 troops. That constitutes over 95% of the entire Russian Ground Force of approximately 350,000 personnel, not including available Russian airborne, special operations, or National Guard troops.
All estimates that follow are based on the troop-to-task baseline estimates here. I used the same population data and other cited sources to build the present estimate. As I did in the first estimate, I used Google Earth Pro for all linear and area calculations. All caveats that applied to the first article apply to this article. Estimating troop-to-task is an informed subjective activity. Numbers presented here are estimates only and should not be used for military planning purposes.
Task 1: Secure the Perimeter of the Occupied Territory
In the likely event that the Russians defeat the Ukrainian defenders, the war probably will not end. Ukrainians probably will continue to fight as insurgents against the Russian occupiers. As of early March 2022, hundreds of millions of dollars in Western military equipment are flowing into Western Ukraine and into the combat zone. During an occupation, these contributions likely will continue in support of an insurgency. Russia will be forced to secure the perimeter of the occupied territory to try to prevent infiltrations and protect their occupying army. Figure 1, below, shows the estimated occupied territory and the perimeter.
From the Belarusian border north of Kyiv to the Russian border east of Mariupol, the perimeter of the estimated occupied territory is approximately 2,950 kilometers in length. Using the baseline calculation of one battalion of approximately 540 troops to secure each 80-kilometer section, perimeter security would require 19,980 (rounded up to +20,000) front-line troops. Because these troops need staff and logistics support, this amounts to two reinforced Russian divisions with 2,400 staff, logistics, and aviation troops each (+ 4,800) and expanded coastal security (+1,500 troops) plus an army headquarters (1,000) for a Task 1 subtotal of 27,300.
Task 2: Secure Key Nodes in Urban Areas
If the Russians intend to hold or even annex the territory they will have seized, they will eventually need to provide food, water, power, sanitation, healthcare, and other essential services. Insurgents will seek to target some of this infrastructure to undermine the occupation. There may be approximately 26 million people living in this occupied zone. Given the uncertainty of Ukrainian population estimates, population displacement from the war, and the relatively stable situation in Crimea (~2 million people), I use 19 million as a round population estimate. There are 22 major urban areas in the occupied zone.
Figure 2, below, shows the urban areas requiring key node security. Major urban areas like Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Odessa will probably have more than five key nodes, so this should be considered a low estimate.
In the original troop-to-task analysis I estimated that each urban area would have five key nodes requiring security, that each node would require 145 troops, and that every three nodes would require another 140 troops.
Therefore, key node security would require 25,900 troops (22 nodes x 5 nodes = 110, 110 x 145 troops = 15,950 + 5,180 staff = 21,130 + 4,800 division staff and attachments = 25,900, rounded down). The running occupation subtotal for Tasks 1 and 2 is 53,200 (27,300 + 25,900 = 53,200).
Task 3: Secure Key Roads and Railways
Keeping an occupation force fueled, fed, and supplied with ammunition and spare parts for vehicles, radios, and other equipment requires freedom of movement throughout the occupied area. Ukrainian insurgents will probably work to disrupt logistics traffic, ambush convoys, plant mines and other explosive devices, and otherwise disrupt Russian freedom of movement. Securing lines of communication requires setting up checkpoints and running patrols along the routes most often used by occupying forces. Some risk must be taken on secondary roads, all of which can be used by insurgents to infiltrate and conduct attacks.
Figure 3, below, shows the 7,255 kilometers of secured road and railway in dark green, as well as a number of unsecured secondary roads located throughout the occupied territory.
I estimated that each 40-kilometer section of secured road and rail would require 63 Russian troops, the equivalent of two platoons or a reduced company. Working from a map analysis of the occupied territory, I estimated the Russians would need to secure 7,255 kilometers of road and railway. This breaks down into 181 sections, 63 troops per section (+11,403), with 140 battalion staff for every 400 troops (+4,060), plus two division staffs and attachments (+4,800) for 20,300 troops, rounded up. The running occupation subtotal for Tasks 1, 2, and 3 is 73,500 (27,300 + 25,900 + 20,300 = 73,500).
Task 4: Secure the Population and Conduct Counterinsurgency
If Russia’s invasion succeeds, the Russian Federation will assume de facto responsibility for the well-being of approximately 19 million people. That is equivalent to the population of the American states of New York or Florida. It is also approximately 14% of the current estimated population of Russia. In terms of landmass and population, this will be by far the largest occupation attempted by the Soviet Union or the Russian Federation since the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe in the years after World War II. Much of the infrastructure needed to sustain the Ukrainian population in the occupied zone is presently being destroyed. Occupation officers will find themselves responsible for supporting millions of people and rebuilding their cities while fending off an active, NATO-backed insurgency. A dedicated joint civil-military and counterinsurgency force will be needed to give the Russians any hope of successfully managing these tasks.
Figure 4, below, shows the Ukrainian State Statistics Committee estimated populations for each Ukrainian oblast, or state, within the occupied territory.
In the original troop-to-task estimate, I used the population estimate for Kharkiv oblast as a baseline for analysis. I separated Kharkiv into 10 sections of approximately 173,000 people each and identified the need for a reinforced Russian motorized infantry battalion of 650 soldiers to secure each section. Using this same baseline estimate, Russia would need to assign 110 battalions (+ 71,500 troops) within eight divisions (+ 22,400 division staff and attachments) and one army group (+1,000) for a total of 94,900 troops. Total occupation troop cost for all four tasks is 168,000 (27,300 + 25,900 + 20,300 + 94,900 = 168,400, rounded down). Another 168,000 troops would need to be kept in constant rotation for occupation duty, tying down approximately 336,000 Russian troops for what may be a multi-year occupation.
If this occupation troop to task estimate seems high, points of comparison might be useful. When the Soviet Union began its unsuccessful occupation of Afghanistan in 1979, Afghanistan had a population of approximately 13 million people. At the peak of its counterinsurgency operation, the Soviets had approximately 100,000 troops in Afghanistan supported by an equivalent number of Afghan troops and militiamen. At the end of 2011, two years before the Islamic State seized one-third of the country, the U.S.-led coalition, and the Iraqi security forces fielded approximately 750,000 troops and police to control approximately 30 million people. Applying the oft-referenced 2% troop-to-population ratio—an approach I advise against—suggests the need for 380,000 troops in Ukraine with another 380,000 troops in constant rotation for a total of 760,000 Russian occupation troops.
Russia’s Advantages and Disadvantages in Occupation
Russia has at least two distinct advantages and faces at least seven significant disadvantages in a prospective occupation. Proximity to the Russian border and relatively flat terrain provide good access for logistics and air support, and Russian intelligence officers have a good understanding of Ukrainian language and culture. They will not face the same cultural challenges the United States faced in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan.
However, Russia’s aggressive destruction of Ukraine’s infrastructure will make the occupation costly and onerous. Based in part on this RAND examination of insurgency dynamics, the Russians will also be challenged by the existence of a large sanctuary in western Ukraine; strong external support for the insurgency; the probable emergence of a hybrid rural-urban insurgency (which are particularly difficult to dig out); the probable lack of a legitimate partner government in Kyiv; probable lack of any reliable partner security forces to defray the cost of all of these occupation tasks; and, primarily, the very low likelihood that the Russians will seek or be able to address the root causes that will drive the insurgency. Russians destroying Ukraine today are fueling the will to kill Russian soldiers tomorrow and for years to come.
Dr. Ben Connable is a senior nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council and adjunct professor of security studies at Georgetown University.
Updated: Russian Occupation of Ukraine Troop-to-Task Estimate
By Ben Connable
March 09, 2022
<img alt="Updated: Russian Occupation of Ukraine Troop-to-Task Estimate"> (AP Photo/Vadim Ghirda)
In early February, I published a detailed forecast estimating the number of troops the Russians would have to deploy to successfully occupy part of Ukraine. In my notional scenario, I assumed the Russians would only advance as far as Kharkiv and the lower Dnieper river. Using military troop-to-task analysis, I estimated Russia would have to deploy 83,000 troops to secure that part of Ukraine and keep another 83,000 in constant rotation for a total of about 160,000 troops. That is just under half of the entire Russian army (the Russian Ground Force). In this article, I update the occupation troop-to-task assessment, accounting for President Putin's more ambitious invasion through Kyiv in the north and Odessa in the south.
This updated estimate is based on what I perceive to be four bare-minimum tasks the Russians will need to perform: (1) secure the perimeter of their occupied area from infiltration; (2) secure key nodes like power stations and communications centers in urban areas; (3) secure key roads and railways to keep open interior lines of communication; and (4) secure the population and conduct civil-military and counterinsurgency operations. Using a new, probable limit of advance just west of the Dnieper River and north of Odessa, I estimate that the Russians would need to deploy 168,000 occupation troops and keep another 168,000 in constant rotation for a total of 336,000 troops. That constitutes over 95% of the entire Russian Ground Force of approximately 350,000 personnel, not including available Russian airborne, special operations, or National Guard troops.
All estimates that follow are based on the troop-to-task baseline estimates here. I used the same population data and other cited sources to build the present estimate. As I did in the first estimate, I used Google Earth Pro for all linear and area calculations. All caveats that applied to the first article apply to this article. Estimating troop-to-task is an informed subjective activity. Numbers presented here are estimates only and should not be used for military planning purposes.
Task 1: Secure the Perimeter of the Occupied Territory
In the likely event that the Russians defeat the Ukrainian defenders, the war probably will not end. Ukrainians probably will continue to fight as insurgents against the Russian occupiers. As of early March 2022, hundreds of millions of dollars in Western military equipment are flowing into Western Ukraine and into the combat zone. During an occupation, these contributions likely will continue in support of an insurgency. Russia will be forced to secure the perimeter of the occupied territory to try to prevent infiltrations and protect their occupying army. Figure 1, below, shows the estimated occupied territory and the perimeter.
Figure 1: Securing the 2,950-Kilometer Linear Perimeter
Ben Connable
From the Belarusian border north of Kyiv to the Russian border east of Mariupol, the perimeter of the estimated occupied territory is approximately 2,950 kilometers in length. Using the baseline calculation of one battalion of approximately 540 troops to secure each 80-kilometer section, perimeter security would require 19,980 (rounded up to +20,000) front-line troops. Because these troops need staff and logistics support, this amounts to two reinforced Russian divisions with 2,400 staff, logistics, and aviation troops each (+ 4,800) and expanded coastal security (+1,500 troops) plus an army headquarters (1,000) for a Task 1 subtotal of 27,300.
Task 2: Secure Key Nodes in Urban Areas
If the Russians intend to hold or even annex the territory they will have seized, they will eventually need to provide food, water, power, sanitation, healthcare, and other essential services. Insurgents will seek to target some of this infrastructure to undermine the occupation. There may be approximately 26 million people living in this occupied zone. Given the uncertainty of Ukrainian population estimates, population displacement from the war, and the relatively stable situation in Crimea (~2 million people), I use 19 million as a round population estimate. There are 22 major urban areas in the occupied zone.
Figure 2, below, shows the urban areas requiring key node security. Major urban areas like Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Odessa will probably have more than five key nodes, so this should be considered a low estimate.
Figure 2:Securing Key Nodes in Urban Areas
Ben Connable
In the original troop-to-task analysis I estimated that each urban area would have five key nodes requiring security, that each node would require 145 troops, and that every three nodes would require another 140 troops.
Therefore, key node security would require 25,900 troops (22 nodes x 5 nodes = 110, 110 x 145 troops = 15,950 + 5,180 staff = 21,130 + 4,800 division staff and attachments = 25,900, rounded down). The running occupation subtotal for Tasks 1 and 2 is 53,200 (27,300 + 25,900 = 53,200).
Task 3: Secure Key Roads and Railways
Keeping an occupation force fueled, fed, and supplied with ammunition and spare parts for vehicles, radios, and other equipment requires freedom of movement throughout the occupied area. Ukrainian insurgents will probably work to disrupt logistics traffic, ambush convoys, plant mines and other explosive devices, and otherwise disrupt Russian freedom of movement. Securing lines of communication requires setting up checkpoints and running patrols along the routes most often used by occupying forces. Some risk must be taken on secondary roads, all of which can be used by insurgents to infiltrate and conduct attacks.
Figure 3, below, shows the 7,255 kilometers of secured road and railway in dark green, as well as a number of unsecured secondary roads located throughout the occupied territory.
Figure 3: Securing Road and Railway in the Occupied Territory
Ben Connable
I estimated that each 40-kilometer section of secured road and rail would require 63 Russian troops, the equivalent of two platoons or a reduced company. Working from a map analysis of the occupied territory, I estimated the Russians would need to secure 7,255 kilometers of road and railway. This breaks down into 181 sections, 63 troops per section (+11,403), with 140 battalion staff for every 400 troops (+4,060), plus two division staffs and attachments (+4,800) for 20,300 troops, rounded up. The running occupation subtotal for Tasks 1, 2, and 3 is 73,500 (27,300 + 25,900 + 20,300 = 73,500).
Task 4: Secure the Population and Conduct Counterinsurgency
If Russia’s invasion succeeds, the Russian Federation will assume de facto responsibility for the well-being of approximately 19 million people. That is equivalent to the population of the American states of New York or Florida. It is also approximately 14% of the current estimated population of Russia. In terms of landmass and population, this will be by far the largest occupation attempted by the Soviet Union or the Russian Federation since the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe in the years after World War II. Much of the infrastructure needed to sustain the Ukrainian population in the occupied zone is presently being destroyed. Occupation officers will find themselves responsible for supporting millions of people and rebuilding their cities while fending off an active, NATO-backed insurgency. A dedicated joint civil-military and counterinsurgency force will be needed to give the Russians any hope of successfully managing these tasks.
Figure 4, below, shows the Ukrainian State Statistics Committee estimated populations for each Ukrainian oblast, or state, within the occupied territory.
Figure 4: Estimated Population Within the Occupied Territory by Oblast
Ben Connable
In the original troop-to-task estimate, I used the population estimate for Kharkiv oblast as a baseline for analysis. I separated Kharkiv into 10 sections of approximately 173,000 people each and identified the need for a reinforced Russian motorized infantry battalion of 650 soldiers to secure each section. Using this same baseline estimate, Russia would need to assign 110 battalions (+ 71,500 troops) within eight divisions (+ 22,400 division staff and attachments) and one army group (+1,000) for a total of 94,900 troops. Total occupation troop cost for all four tasks is 168,000 (27,300 + 25,900 + 20,300 + 94,900 = 168,400, rounded down). Another 168,000 troops would need to be kept in constant rotation for occupation duty, tying down approximately 336,000 Russian troops for what may be a multi-year occupation.
If this occupation troop to task estimate seems high, points of comparison might be useful. When the Soviet Union began its unsuccessful occupation of Afghanistan in 1979, Afghanistan had a population of approximately 13 million people. At the peak of its counterinsurgency operation, the Soviets had approximately 100,000 troops in Afghanistan supported by an equivalent number of Afghan troops and militiamen. At the end of 2011, two years before the Islamic State seized one-third of the country, the U.S.-led coalition, and the Iraqi security forces fielded approximately 750,000 troops and police to control approximately 30 million people. Applying the oft-referenced 2% troop-to-population ratio—an approach I advise against—suggests the need for 380,000 troops in Ukraine with another 380,000 troops in constant rotation for a total of 760,000 Russian occupation troops.
Russia’s Advantages and Disadvantages in Occupation
Russia has at least two distinct advantages and faces at least seven significant disadvantages in a prospective occupation. Proximity to the Russian border and relatively flat terrain provide good access for logistics and air support, and Russian intelligence officers have a good understanding of Ukrainian language and culture. They will not face the same cultural challenges the United States faced in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan.
However, Russia’s aggressive destruction of Ukraine’s infrastructure will make the occupation costly and onerous. Based in part on this RAND examination of insurgency dynamics, the Russians will also be challenged by the existence of a large sanctuary in western Ukraine; strong external support for the insurgency; the probable emergence of a hybrid rural-urban insurgency (which are particularly difficult to dig out); the probable lack of a legitimate partner government in Kyiv; probable lack of any reliable partner security forces to defray the cost of all of these occupation tasks; and, primarily, the very low likelihood that the Russians will seek or be able to address the root causes that will drive the insurgency. Russians destroying Ukraine today are fueling the will to kill Russian soldiers tomorrow and for years to come.
Dr. Ben Connable is a senior nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council and adjunct professor of security studies at Georgetown University.
- bambino
- 03-11-2022, 06:46 AM
- Why_Yes_I_Do
- 03-11-2022, 09:20 AM
When even our own story line changes daily, it is difficult to believe much of anything our media is calling. Remember the mostly peaceful protests? Regardless, I think Russia is being methodical and moving slowly on purpose, to give Ukraine a chance to call the ball and have them stop getting pounded further. Meanwhile the LambSCREAMMedia, makes it sound as though Ukraine (clearly an underdog and you know how we like underdogs) is winning against the Ruskie bad-guy - all the while failing to investigate how and why they are in this pickle in the first place.
As an example of the propaganda
we are being fed. As I stated earlier elsewhere:
Day 1 Russia claims US has biolabs in Ukraine
Day 2 US claims it does not have biolabs in Ukraine
Day 3 Russia claims it has documents to prove US biolabs in Ukraine
Day 4 US claims it does not have biolabs in Ukraine
Day 5 Russia releases documents on the US biolabs in Ukraine
Day 6 US says it does have biolabs in Ukraine
Day 7 Russia claims to have captured the US biolabs in Ukraine
Day 8 US says it does not have biolabs in Ukraine
Day 9 Russia releases more documents on the US biolabs in Ukraine
Day 10 US says it has had biolabs in Ukraine for decades and they only work on diseases of animals like bats, birds and some human things and that there is nothing to fear but fear itself
Day 11 Russia claims it will dismantle the US biolabs in Ukraine
Day 12 US says it has been deactivating the biolabs in Ukraine for decades
So we went from no labs, to yes labs, back to no labs, to been there for decades in under two weeks. How does anyone not understand this scenario as a real problem in our news coverage?!?
As an example of the propaganda
we are being fed. As I stated earlier elsewhere: Day 1 Russia claims US has biolabs in Ukraine
Day 2 US claims it does not have biolabs in Ukraine
Day 3 Russia claims it has documents to prove US biolabs in Ukraine
Day 4 US claims it does not have biolabs in Ukraine
Day 5 Russia releases documents on the US biolabs in Ukraine
Day 6 US says it does have biolabs in Ukraine
Day 7 Russia claims to have captured the US biolabs in Ukraine
Day 8 US says it does not have biolabs in Ukraine
Day 9 Russia releases more documents on the US biolabs in Ukraine
Day 10 US says it has had biolabs in Ukraine for decades and they only work on diseases of animals like bats, birds and some human things and that there is nothing to fear but fear itself
Day 11 Russia claims it will dismantle the US biolabs in Ukraine
Day 12 US says it has been deactivating the biolabs in Ukraine for decades
So we went from no labs, to yes labs, back to no labs, to been there for decades in under two weeks. How does anyone not understand this scenario as a real problem in our news coverage?!?
- Yssup Rider
- 03-11-2022, 09:23 AM
... Nothing other-than me-own life and livelyhood here in America.So now you’re from Hackney, London?
Same as you.
... Though I DO believe most people would surely feel better
about a barney with Russia if Trump were on instead of Sleepy Joe.
That's fer bleedin' sure!
### Salty Originally Posted by Salty Again
Make up your mind already dude.
You get A Quacker Award for that fake performance.
- Yssup Rider
- 03-11-2022, 09:25 AM
When even our own story line changes daily, it is difficult to believe much of anything our media is calling. Remember the mostly peaceful protests? Regardless, I think Russia is being methodical and moving slowly on purpose, to give Ukraine a chance to call the ball and have them stop getting pounded further. Meanwhile the LambSCREAMMedia, makes it sound as though Ukraine (clearly an underdog and you know how we like underdogs) is winning against the Ruskie bad-guy - all the while failing to investigate how and why they are in this pickle in the first place.You already posted this in at least one other thread… maybe more.
As an example of the propaganda
Day 1 Russia claims US has biolabs in Ukraine
Day 2 US claims it does not have biolabs in Ukraine
Day 3 Russia claims it has documents to prove US biolabs in Ukraine
Day 4 US claims it does not have biolabs in Ukraine
Day 5 Russia releases documents on the US biolabs in Ukraine
Day 6 US says it does have biolabs in Ukraine
Day 7 Russia claims to have captured the US biolabs in Ukraine
Day 8 US says it does not have biolabs in Ukraine
Day 9 Russia releases more documents on the US biolabs in Ukraine
Day 10 US says it has had biolabs in Ukraine for decades and they only work on diseases of animals like bats, birds and some human things and that there is nothing to fear but fear itself
Day 11 Russia claims it will dismantle the US biolabs in Ukraine
Day 12 US says it has been deactivating the biolabs in Ukraine for decades
So we went from no labs, to yes labs, back to no labs, to been there for decades in under two weeks. How does anyone not understand this scenario as a real problem in our news coverage?!? Originally Posted by Why_Yes_I_Do
Seems like you’re hung up on this but haven’t yet provided a link for your hysterical rants.
You, too, get a Quacker Award.
- Why_Yes_I_Do
- 03-11-2022, 04:41 PM
So are the Ukrainians having fish to eat since it's Friday again? Guess not. Hmmm...
If the American military was fighting against this group of Russian forces it may have already ended, I mean there is or was a 40 mile convoy or longer of Russian tanks, trucks and everything else lined up on one single stretch of road, it would have been like shooting fish in a barrel, these aren't battle tested Russian forces for the most part, geez, I almost feel sorry for them, Ukraine is kicking the shit out of them with low level weapons. "To the Russian battleship, go fook yourself", now there's a T-shirt. Originally Posted by arañanegra
- Why_Yes_I_Do
- 03-11-2022, 05:10 PM
Unfortunately, F Joe Biden is unable to utilize the American Woke AF military to intervene. Sounds like he is pretty grumpy about getting the blame for his train wreck performance with the economy too. He has blathered that he wants to send the CA National Guard over. Let's help old Cabbage Head out with a worthwhile plan.
Here's my idea for a Win-Win-Win option. Round up the Antifa(g)s and BLMsters and ship them over to handle it. We know they are comfortable riding buses in a group and they are of prime military age, both boys and girls. Although, their green electric scooters wouldn't be able to cross the oceans, so we would have to airlift them over and drop them from the planes along with their green electric scooters. Shoot, might even give some a functional parachute. Heck, they can even wear their black garb and take their sticks, bats and trash can shields - frozen water bottles optional. Plus, they would get three hots and cot, just like in Mommy's basement and they would get paid military wages, which is bound to be more than the $25 p/protest they were getting paid before.
No doubt that would get the Ruskies dieing in droves. Well... mostly from laughter, but a dead Commie is a good commie. Right? And if they unthinkable <insert prayer here> happens and the Ruskies crush them like bugs... We still win.
Go get 'em.
Here's my idea for a Win-Win-Win option. Round up the Antifa(g)s and BLMsters and ship them over to handle it. We know they are comfortable riding buses in a group and they are of prime military age, both boys and girls. Although, their green electric scooters wouldn't be able to cross the oceans, so we would have to airlift them over and drop them from the planes along with their green electric scooters. Shoot, might even give some a functional parachute. Heck, they can even wear their black garb and take their sticks, bats and trash can shields - frozen water bottles optional. Plus, they would get three hots and cot, just like in Mommy's basement and they would get paid military wages, which is bound to be more than the $25 p/protest they were getting paid before.
No doubt that would get the Ruskies dieing in droves. Well... mostly from laughter, but a dead Commie is a good commie. Right? And if they unthinkable <insert prayer here> happens and the Ruskies crush them like bugs... We still win.
Go get 'em.
- ICU 812
- 03-12-2022, 06:27 AM
How is thr Russian Army?
It may verry well be as bad as it currently seems to be But:
It may also be that they didn't send in The A-Team at the start. Recall the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. The parents of most posters here weren't even born yet I know. . . . From the end of WW-II, the Hungarians were oppressively occupied by the Russian Army and Stalinist communist party.
They successfully revolted against the occupying force who were equipped with WW-II eras gear. The Russian counter attack was crushing with front line troops and modern gear (for 1956), marking the first time any western observer had seen an AK-47 or a T-55 tank. Resolve and gasoline filled wine bottles were just not enough. Hungary remained under the communist yoke till the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. For more on this revolution, read "The Bridge at Andou" bi James Michner. It is not fiction.
Pretty much the same thing happened to Checislovacia in 1968.
I think things will go the same way for Ukraine now, so many years later on.
Russian tactics don't change much.
It may verry well be as bad as it currently seems to be But:
It may also be that they didn't send in The A-Team at the start. Recall the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. The parents of most posters here weren't even born yet I know. . . . From the end of WW-II, the Hungarians were oppressively occupied by the Russian Army and Stalinist communist party.
They successfully revolted against the occupying force who were equipped with WW-II eras gear. The Russian counter attack was crushing with front line troops and modern gear (for 1956), marking the first time any western observer had seen an AK-47 or a T-55 tank. Resolve and gasoline filled wine bottles were just not enough. Hungary remained under the communist yoke till the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. For more on this revolution, read "The Bridge at Andou" bi James Michner. It is not fiction.
Pretty much the same thing happened to Checislovacia in 1968.
I think things will go the same way for Ukraine now, so many years later on.
Russian tactics don't change much.
- Why_Yes_I_Do
- 03-12-2022, 07:10 AM
