During the Reagan Administration the Tax Code under went some significant changes, but IMO the most devastating was the elimination of the "sheltered gains" multi-family housing regulations in which investors in limited partnerships were allowed to take their gains after 20-25 years "tax free" ... so long as the LP's followed the rules of generating NO PROFITS during the life of the LP .... which meant that all revenues were plowed back into the low income (sliding scale) complexes.
What the LPs meant was high purchases of heavy appliances, roofing materials, and upgrading constant repairs with the associated labor expenses .... which consumed the profits ... while the tenants enjoyed quality places to live that were regularly UPGRADED. There were 1,000's of them around the country. Creating many manufacturing and local labor jobs .... installing, repairing, and servicing.
In a 90 day window during which no gains taxes would be paid they were dumped on the market ..... which began driving down the real estate market in multi-family projects .... and systematically driving out low income families as the projects were converted to standard rental complexes.....not to mention loss of manufacturing, sales, and labor jobs.
My point is ... there are sometimes unintended consequences when people don't back up and look at the larger picture .... and what happens to the "dominoes."
The same happens every time there is a discussion about elimination of the deductions for 2nd homes (vacation properties) .... the vacation home market starts suffering for months while Congress (and the media) "debate" whether to get rid of it.
Originally Posted by LexusLover
You made a number of very good points, and it certainly is the case that dramatic tax law changes can produce severe adverse consequences.
One of the very worst in history, in my view, was the way the 1986 tax reforms torpedoed commercial real estate loan portfolios almost overnight.
Prior to 1986, Treasury rules (generally) allowed a 2:1 write-off for investors in real estate LPs that typically invested in apartment complexes, office buildings, warehouse/distribution space, and shopping centers. The deal structure typically provided for about five years of equal annual capital calls. A typical proposal pitched to small investors, such as relatively high-income (50% tax bracket) professionals, might provide for, say, a $100K total commitment divided into five annual payments. Then the proposed operations of the underlying asset and the loan thereon would be designed to produce accelerated depreciation deductions for the limited partners equaling twice that year's capital call. This meant that investors in the 50% bracket (the top rate in the years leading up to 1986) could, in essence, "buy" their partnership interest for free! So unless the property value cratered (which, unfortunately, it did in most cases), the investor was sure to win and essentially undertook no risk, since his interest was fully "paid for" with tax savings.
The problem with this, of course, arose from the fact that most of these deals were highly leveraged, so the values of loan portfolios would evaporate if the value of the underlying asset declined by even a small amount -- and in many cases, it plunged by several tens of percentage points when the bust accelerated into full-swing.
The result was that large Texas banks and S&Ls started failing in wholesale fashion, and the state's economy tanked for a couple of years in the late '80s.
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