I went on to say that the weapons inspectors should be given the opportunity to complete their assignment (supposedly they needed another 5-6 months). I went on to conclude that if WMD's were found, then and only then, an invasion should be seriously considered. To take it s step further, I even went as far as praising the Bush Administration for putting the weapons inspectors back in Iraq. Something Clinton had been reluctant to do!
Originally Posted by bigtex
I think I know why BT voted for Obaminable now. I have been wondering.
Security Council
4714th Meeting (AM)
"COLIN L. POWELL, Secretary of State of the
United States, said today’s meeting concerned a very, very important question, namely, whether the Iraqi leadership had made the decision to comply with Security Council resolutions and to rid itself of all weapons of mass destruction and infrastructure for such weapons. The answer was not about how many inspectors were on the ground, or how much more time and effort should be given, nor whether more benchmarks were needed. The answer depended on whether Iraq had made the choice to actively cooperate in every possible manner in the immediate and complete disarmament of its prohibited weapons.
Today’s briefings had shed more light on that difficult question, he said. He had listened very carefully to hear if Iraq had finally understood that the will of the international community must be obeyed. He was pleased to hear some new progress and activity with respect to substance, but he was sorry that that was all still coming in a grudging manner and that Iraq was still refusing to offer immediate, active and unconditional cooperation -- not late, but immediate, not passive, but active, and not conditional, but unconditional in every respect. Despite some progress, he still found a catalogue of non-cooperation. If Iraq genuinely wanted to disarm, he would not have to worry about setting up the means to look for mobile biological units, and search extensively for the underground facilities he knew existed.
Iraq must not be allowed to shift the burden of proof onto the inspectors nor could the world return to the failed bargain of resolution 1284 (1998), which offered partial relief for partial disclosure. Iraq’s “initiatives” were small steps, which had not come forward willingly and freely, but had been “pulled out” or “pressed out” by the possibility of military force and the political will of the Security Council. Iraq had taken those “initiatives” only grudgingly and primarily under the threat of force. He was pleased that some Al Samoud 2 missiles were being broken up, although that had perhaps paused for the moment. But, the problem was it had not been disclosed how many missiles were there and whether there was the infrastructure to produce more. The intent of the Iraqi regime was to keep from turning over all of its mass destruction weapons, and that had not changed. If Iraq had made that strategic decision to disarm, cooperation would be enthusiastic, and not coerced or pressured.
Turning to Dr. ElBaradei’s briefing, he said that, in 1991, the IAEA was just days away from determining that Iraq did not have a nuclear programme, but it soon found out otherwise. The Agency was now reaching a similar conclusion, but it should be cautious and keep the books open. There was still some dispute about some specific items, including the use for the aluminium tubes, which Iraq had been trying to acquire over the years. A European country where Iraq had shopped for such tubes had provided evidence that the tolerances being sought by Iraq could not be justified for use by unguided rockets. The UNMOVIC had put together a solid piece of research that added up, fact by chilling fact, to a damning record of 12 years of lies, deception and failure to come clean by Iraq.
He said he had looked carefully at the document and found nearly
30 instances where Iraq had refused to provide credible evidence substantiating its claims, and 17 examples where the inspectors actually uncovered evidence contradicting Iraq’s claims, including the planting of false evidence. There was page after page of how Iraq had obstructed the inspectors at nearly every turn over the years. On the bombs capable of carrying chemical and biological warfare agents, the report said that during 1992 Iraq had changed its declaration on the number of bombs it had produced, saying that it had produced a total of 1,200. That number was subsequently changed to 1,550. Given that information by Iraq, the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) had been unable to calculate the total number of such bombs. The present report says it had proved impossible to do so, but UNMOVIC had not discounted the possibility the chemical- and biological-filled bombs in the hundreds remained in Iraq.
All outstanding questions could easily have been cleared up in the
7 December 2002 declaration from Iraq. There should not be those outstanding issues to resolve, but there were. The present document showed that Iraq still had the capability to manufacture, not only chemical, but also biological weapons, and that it still had tens of thousands of delivery systems, including dangerous unmanned vehicles. In his report today, Dr. Blix had remarked on the paucity of information on Iraq’s programmes since 1998. Everyone was working hard to fill that gap, but Iraq was the one to do that if it was truly complying. Indeed, it would be inundating the inspectors with new information, setting out in detail all of its banned weapons programmes. Then, and only then, could the inspectors do the credible job of verifying, destroying and monitoring.
He said that Iraq’s current behaviour revealed a strategic decision to delay, deceive and throw us off the trail, leading to a fracturing of the international community. The Iraqis still were not volunteering information, and when they were, it was partial and misleading, and stories changed whenever they were confronted. The Council’s membership carried a heavy responsibility to take hard decisions on tough issues, including the one it faced today. Last November, the Council had stepped up to its responsibility. It must not walk away now with Iraq, once again, marching down the merry path of weapons of mass destruction, threatening the region and the world. Members must not forget the horrors going on in Iraq. Now was the time for it to send a clear message to Saddam Hussein that it had not been taken in by his transparent tactics.
Nobody wanted war, he said, but it was clear that the limited process and slight substantive changes in Iraq had come from the presence of a large military force, from nations willing to put their military men and women in harm’s way. The unified political will of the Council, and the willingness to use force if it came to that, would ensure that the disarmament of Iraq was achieved. Now was the time for the Council to say that the clock had not been stopped by Saddam Hussein’s stratagems and machinations. The resolution put forward for Council action was appropriate, and it should be brought before it in the very near future. The consequences of Saddam Hussein’s continued refusal to disarm would be very, very real."
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/sc7682.doc.htm
I appreciate BT's learned and in depth evaluation of the situation, which is consistent with the European and Middle Eastern perception of the "need" for continued "inspections" .... of course what BT fails to accept and apparently recognize that even those who were like mindly opposed to military action from the beginning perceived that Iraq had a WMD program that required dismantly along with the ongoing development of a delivery system (or the $$ to buy them from N.K.).
If there was no belief that it had, why "inspectors"?
Powell is, I believe, more "informed" and credible than BT. This thread is not about the rehashing of the decision to invade Iraq, nor about BT's "special knowledge" regarding the existence of WMD's and facilitating programs ...
...although BT would much rather discuss those topics than the actual thread topic .... I understand why.
"His Man" is presiding over high unemployment and high poverty ... and cannot or will not do a damn thing about it.
