In the freshwater school, what mechanism does the government have to stabilize the economy? Keynesian has built-in measures if demand falters. Is freshwater like supply-side in that it is very dependent on production? Would you also say that the argument has become largely theoretical, since elements of both are used?
Originally Posted by UnderConstruction
Keynesianism does not specifically contain "built-in" measures to resuscitate the economy; rather, it simply provides the doctrinal framework within which policymakers may undertake fiscal and monetary operations of their choosing. Within that framework, one of the first things policymakers did was to create (in the 1930s) and later expand unemployment insurance, which together with other safety net programs creates countercyclical spending of the sort that did not occur in the 1920s and before.
Although today's "freshwater" economists do not necessarily oppose that, they are generally not on board with the sort of large-scale fiscal expansion recommended by their Keynesian brethren.
I think Keynesian prescriptions were more potent in the 1930s than they are today
Originally Posted by lustylad
Although I am a bit skeptical of their efficacy even in the 1930s, it seems fair to say that they work even less well now.
A very interesting explanation, in my opinion, was offered by labor lawyer Thomas Geoghegan, writing in
The Nation. Although I disagree with much of what Geoghegan (rhymes with Reagan) wrote, I think he makes some very key points.
Among them:
Keynes absolutely
abhorred trade deficits. I suspect he would see a lot wrong with how we import and borrow a great deal compared to what we save, produce, and export, and we've been covering that up and papering it over with 40+ years of monetary activism. During a long period of "dollar diplomacy" followed by what many began referring to as "dollar hegemony," we've been able to get away with that -- so far.
See Geoghegan article @
http://www.thenation.com/article/163...uld-keynes-do#
Too bad neither of them is still alive. I would love to hear Friedman's views on quantitative easing or Keynes' reactions to our modern-day addiction to non-stop deficit spending.
Originally Posted by lustylad
Although it's obviously unclear whether he would have been likely to have supported the quantity of QE embarked on by central banks in the U.S., Europe, and Japan today, Friedman was an early supporter of the idea.
http://www.forbes.com/sites/timothyl...-case-for-qe3/
http://noahpinionblog.blogspot.com/2...istory-on.html
http://macromarketmusings.blogspot.c...ould-have.html
Rand Paul clearly seems to think Milton Friedman was of the Austrian school. That's flatly wrong, as a couple of rather spirited debates between him and Murray Rothbard showed.
And my read of Keynes strongly suggests that he would have big problems with non-stop deficit spending. Of course, back in the days during and prior to the years when he produced his famous works, it was customary to run surpluses -- or at least budgets that were approximately in balance -- other than during wars or other crises.
You mention the “iconic Paul Samuelson”. He was a brilliant economist whose thick best-selling textbook introduced me to the discipline years ago. Yet like all economists, he often got it wrong. Based on Keynesian theory, he warned that a sharp recession would occur once the government's WW2 spending binge was over. As it turned out, the US economy adjusted fairly smoothly and converted to peacetime production without a serious downturn, even though federal spending nosedived from 43% of GDP in 1944 to only 9% of GDP four years later! I like to point out this history when Keynesians today whine about the supposed economic damage inflicted by what they define as “austerity”.
Originally Posted by lustylad
The Samuelson text was my introduction as well, as I'm sure it was for quite a few million others.
And, yes, he and virtually all Keynesian economists of the day thought we'd be right back in the soup after World War II ended. But despite the Great Depression and a terribly costly war, we as a nation had a very deep pool of savings and were the world's greatest creditor nation. With millions of new household formations and a nascent baby boom, there was enormous pent-up demand for housing and almost everything else industry could ramp up to produce. And, following several years of wartime rationing and suppressed consumption, our parents and grandparents had the resources to pay for it.
Additionally, most of the industrial capacity of what would otherwise have been our chief global competitors had been bombed away, and would take many years to become close to fully resuscitated. Our manufacturing and exporting economy really started rocking.