Thanks for the informative and thought provoking pieces by Dudley and Cullen Roche in your posts on page 6 of this thread.Regarding your observation/question concerning the Italicized segment, here's my take.
In particular, I'd never thought about the following, which makes a lot of sense, and may help explain in part why many economists believe the Fed will be able get away with a peak Fed Funds rate around 2.5% to 3% this time around:
In contrast to many other countries, the U.S. economy doesn’t respond directly to the level of short-term interest rates. Most home borrowers aren’t affected, because they have long-term, fixed-rate mortgages. And, again in contrast to many other countries, many U.S. households do hold a significant amount of their wealth in equities. As a result, they’re sensitive to financial conditions: Equity prices influence how wealthy they feel, and how willing they are to spend rather than save.
I also liked the punch bowl comment, although I'm not sure I agree with it. One of the previous chairmen of the Federal Reserve said something like "It's the Fed's job to take away the punch bowl from the party when people start getting lit." Well, it seems to me like this Fed has been more inclined to spike the bowl with Everclear when the party really gets going.
I didn't really understand the italicized part below. At some point presumably inflation will be under control and the Fed will back off. Why does the expectation that will happen make it more difficult for the Fed to jack up rates now?
The S&P 500 index is down only about 4% from its peak in early January, and still up a lot from its pre-pandemic level. Similarly, the yield on the 10-year Treasury note stands at 2.5%, up just 0.75 percentage point from a year ago and still way below the inflation rate. This is happening because market participants expect higher short-term rates to undermine economic growth and force the Fed to reverse course in 2024 and 2025 — but these very expectations are preventing the tightening of financial conditions that would make such an outcome more likely.
There was an article in the Wall Street Journal this weekend, a news piece, not an editorial, that said 3 million Americans had dropped out of the labor force as a result of COVID. You have people who just don't want to work anymore, some because they're afraid they'll get COVID, and others because of other reasons. I wonder what kind of an effect that will have? I'd think it would increase the probability of some kind of wage/price spiral, if there's a big shortage of labor as a result. Originally Posted by Tiny
Market participants may very soon increasingly start to believe that the specter of short-term interest rate hikes will begin suppressing prospects for economic growth over the next year or two, if not precipitate a full-blown recession outright. (I think it's more likely than not that a recession will begin soon, if indeed it hasn't already. Remember, there's a long history of majorities of polled economists opining that there's no recession on the horizon even as late as the point when we were already a couple of months into one.)
If such a brewing set of expectations births a new set of expectations that the Fed will pivot from concerns about inflation to fears of recession, the tightening cycle could end up being quickly reversed.
As I noted in a recent post, the Fed typically attempts to follow the "path of least embarrassment." Right now, that's fighting inflation. However, a turn to (relative) fiscal austerity (there aren't going to be any more gigantic covid relief or stimulus packages) will likely cause inflation to dissipate, and then the curtain will come down on any semblance of healthy demand-led growth. What does that mean? Hello, recession. (This is the fakest, shakiest economic "expansion" in modern history.)
Then the "path of least embarrassment" would be to cut rates again and possibly even resume bond-buying. (Thus the "drunk in the shower" metaphor in my earlier post!)
Concerning the labor force decline of about 3 million:
That's been much discussed by a number of people in recent forums. One key point is that after the pandemic set in, many people expecting to retire within the next four or five years decided just to check out a little earlier than previously planned. Although in some cases that might have been out of covid fear, in many instances it was just a case of "momentum" as people got used to staying home, and liked it -- especially if, as a result of extended covid-era unemployment benefits and stimulus checks, they had a bit more cash than they otherwise would have.
I suspect that that labor demand may be largely fulfilled during the coming months -- and although many in the workforce will see pay raises this year, there may not be an extended wage-price spiral like in the 1970s, for two reasons.
First, inflation expectations are not baked into expectations to nearly the extent that they were during the great inflation of that period.
Second, only a small fraction of the private section workforce is unionized compared with the '70s, so contracts do not generally include COLAs of any kind.
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