https://www.vox.com/2022/7/26/232781...iden-explained
Biden’s boss President Xi says it would be an act of war.
She has now painted herself into a corner. Cancelling the trip shows weakness, going pisses off her bosses boss.
Of course, she does need to get over there and protect her insider trading investments.
What to do.?
- Jackie S
- 07-29-2022, 12:37 PM
- Jacuzzme
- 07-29-2022, 12:43 PM
Maybe we’ll get lucky and the plane will crash (after the pilots eject).
- WTF
- 07-29-2022, 12:48 PM
Some of you need to get a life.
Plus you're obviously not making any money as comedians.
Plus you're obviously not making any money as comedians.
- LayingPipe
- 07-29-2022, 02:34 PM
When China wants to make threats to the US they get their puppet N Korea to launch rockets.
Pelosi's on her farewell tour and as long as Taiwan has scotch she'll go.
Pelosi's on her farewell tour and as long as Taiwan has scotch she'll go.
- winn dixie
- 07-29-2022, 02:45 PM
Nobody better hurt them boobies on pelosi.
- HedonistForever
- 07-29-2022, 02:59 PM
Who can do more economic damage to who? Then there is "who is better suited at this point to a military conflict" and there is simply no doubt on that since, according to reports,America has lost every war game scenario with China.
https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/a37158827/us-military-failed-miserably-in-taiwan-invasion-wargame/
The U.S. Military 'Failed Miserably' in a Fake Battle Over Taiwan
The Pentagon has been fighting wars the same way for decades. What happens if someone is taking notes?
The U.S. military reportedly "failed miserably" in a series of wargame scenarios designed to test the Pentagon's might. The flunked exercises, which took place last October, are a red flag that the way the military has operated for years isn't going to fly against today's enemies.
Specifically, a simulated adversary that has studied the American way of war for decades managed to run rings around U.S. forces, defeating them decisively. "They knew exactly what we're going to do before we did it," Gen. John Hyten, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, revealed at an industry event.
While Hyten did not disclose the name of the wargame (it's classifed), he did say that one of the exercises focused exclusively on a brawl between U.S. and Chinese forces fighting over Taiwan—a scenario that seems increasingly likely.
He says there are two main takeaways for the U.S. military. The first involves the concentration of combat power—the American military, like many armed forces, tends to concentrate ships, planes, and ground forces for maximum efficiency and effect. Concentrating forces allows the military to mass firepower, operate more efficiently, and more easily resupply while in the field. In other words, it's easier for everyone on the good guys' side.
But the problem with concentration of mass is that it makes it easier for the enemy to find and kill you. If an enemy knows that American carriers always operate together, for instance, and an enemy discovers one carrier, it then knows a second carrier is close by. By the same token, an Air Force wing of 72 fighter jets operating from a huge, sprawling air base makes it easier to efficiently arm, fuel, and service the fighters, but destroying the base will take out the entire wing. And an Army infantry battalion concentrated in two one-kilometer grid squares is easy to control, but will suffer heavy casualties to artillery barrages.
Another takeaway is that the U.S. military's information dominance is no longer guaranteed, and would probably be in doubt in a future conflict. Since 1991, most of America's enemies have been relatively low-tech armies without the aid of satellites, long-range weapons, cyber forces, or electronic warfare capabilities. As a result, the U.S. military's access to communications, data, and other information has been very secure during wartime, giving friendly forces a huge advantage.
That won't happen in the next war. Potential adversaries Russia and China both have a strong motivation—and more importantly, capability—to attack the Pentagon's information infrastructure. Both countries are aware that U.S. forces are heavily reliant on streams of data, and in a future conflict will attack, jam, and disable the nodes that distribute that information (such as satellites and aircraft-based node) whenever possible.
What does that mean for U.S. forces? Hyten says that the Pentagon is pushing a new concept known as "expanded maneuver," and wants the entire military to adopt it by 2030.
Expanded maneuver is likely exactly what it sounds like—a greater use of mobility to keep U.S. forces out of the enemy's gunsights. Two aircraft carriers, for example, might sail a thousand miles apart while still working together. A wing of fighter jets might be spread out among half a dozen smaller airfields so the destruction of one won't mean the loss of all 72 warplanes. An infantry battalion's subunits might operate farther apart from one another and stay on the move to avoid destruction by enemy artillery.
But what about massing firepower? Long-range weapons can allow widely disparate units to concentrate firepower against an enemy, eliminating the need for close cooperation. Two aircraft carriers might converge on an adversary from different directions, coordinating strikes by using weapons like the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (or JASSM). A wing of fighters might engage enemy aircraft from longer distances using missiles like the upcoming AIM-260 long-range air-to-air missile.
Expanded maneuver will lean more heavily than ever on America's information infrastructure. Commanders in the field will need secure communications and navigation capabilities to coordinate fire and maneuver beyond traditional radio ranges, leaning heavily on satellite and aircraft-relayed communications and data. It's also vitally important that the networks that flow this information are hack-proof.
The battlefield might become a slightly more lonely place for U.S. forces, but that's what it will take to fight and win against a high-tech adversary in the 21st century.
But the good news is, we have more transgender forces and way more pronouns than China. That ought to make you sleep better at night.
It will be a tough pill to swallow but Pelosi should cancel this trip and American should use the time between now and the time China does invade Taiwan, to get our chip manufacturing capabilities back to this country and let China have Taiwan which gives me no great pleasure to say.
https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/a37158827/us-military-failed-miserably-in-taiwan-invasion-wargame/
The U.S. Military 'Failed Miserably' in a Fake Battle Over Taiwan
The Pentagon has been fighting wars the same way for decades. What happens if someone is taking notes?
The U.S. military reportedly "failed miserably" in a series of wargame scenarios designed to test the Pentagon's might. The flunked exercises, which took place last October, are a red flag that the way the military has operated for years isn't going to fly against today's enemies.
Specifically, a simulated adversary that has studied the American way of war for decades managed to run rings around U.S. forces, defeating them decisively. "They knew exactly what we're going to do before we did it," Gen. John Hyten, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, revealed at an industry event.
While Hyten did not disclose the name of the wargame (it's classifed), he did say that one of the exercises focused exclusively on a brawl between U.S. and Chinese forces fighting over Taiwan—a scenario that seems increasingly likely.
He says there are two main takeaways for the U.S. military. The first involves the concentration of combat power—the American military, like many armed forces, tends to concentrate ships, planes, and ground forces for maximum efficiency and effect. Concentrating forces allows the military to mass firepower, operate more efficiently, and more easily resupply while in the field. In other words, it's easier for everyone on the good guys' side.
But the problem with concentration of mass is that it makes it easier for the enemy to find and kill you. If an enemy knows that American carriers always operate together, for instance, and an enemy discovers one carrier, it then knows a second carrier is close by. By the same token, an Air Force wing of 72 fighter jets operating from a huge, sprawling air base makes it easier to efficiently arm, fuel, and service the fighters, but destroying the base will take out the entire wing. And an Army infantry battalion concentrated in two one-kilometer grid squares is easy to control, but will suffer heavy casualties to artillery barrages.
Another takeaway is that the U.S. military's information dominance is no longer guaranteed, and would probably be in doubt in a future conflict. Since 1991, most of America's enemies have been relatively low-tech armies without the aid of satellites, long-range weapons, cyber forces, or electronic warfare capabilities. As a result, the U.S. military's access to communications, data, and other information has been very secure during wartime, giving friendly forces a huge advantage.
That won't happen in the next war. Potential adversaries Russia and China both have a strong motivation—and more importantly, capability—to attack the Pentagon's information infrastructure. Both countries are aware that U.S. forces are heavily reliant on streams of data, and in a future conflict will attack, jam, and disable the nodes that distribute that information (such as satellites and aircraft-based node) whenever possible.
What does that mean for U.S. forces? Hyten says that the Pentagon is pushing a new concept known as "expanded maneuver," and wants the entire military to adopt it by 2030.
Expanded maneuver is likely exactly what it sounds like—a greater use of mobility to keep U.S. forces out of the enemy's gunsights. Two aircraft carriers, for example, might sail a thousand miles apart while still working together. A wing of fighter jets might be spread out among half a dozen smaller airfields so the destruction of one won't mean the loss of all 72 warplanes. An infantry battalion's subunits might operate farther apart from one another and stay on the move to avoid destruction by enemy artillery.
But what about massing firepower? Long-range weapons can allow widely disparate units to concentrate firepower against an enemy, eliminating the need for close cooperation. Two aircraft carriers might converge on an adversary from different directions, coordinating strikes by using weapons like the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (or JASSM). A wing of fighters might engage enemy aircraft from longer distances using missiles like the upcoming AIM-260 long-range air-to-air missile.
Expanded maneuver will lean more heavily than ever on America's information infrastructure. Commanders in the field will need secure communications and navigation capabilities to coordinate fire and maneuver beyond traditional radio ranges, leaning heavily on satellite and aircraft-relayed communications and data. It's also vitally important that the networks that flow this information are hack-proof.
The battlefield might become a slightly more lonely place for U.S. forces, but that's what it will take to fight and win against a high-tech adversary in the 21st century.
But the good news is, we have more transgender forces and way more pronouns than China. That ought to make you sleep better at night.
It will be a tough pill to swallow but Pelosi should cancel this trip and American should use the time between now and the time China does invade Taiwan, to get our chip manufacturing capabilities back to this country and let China have Taiwan which gives me no great pleasure to say.
- Salty Again
- 07-29-2022, 03:23 PM
Nobody better hurt them boobies on pelosi. Originally Posted by winn dixie... Too right, mate.
Pelosi could surely be the President of SAG.
Not the Screen Actor's Guild - "SAG" - as-in S-A-G...
Yet, YOU fancy her when they sag, mate. ..
.... And yes - Pelosi should go there.
Maybe she'll like it so much that she'll never come back.
#### Salty
- texassapper
- 07-29-2022, 03:34 PM
She should only goto Taiwan if we think the Chinese are serious about their threats to shoot down her aircraft....
- Salty Again
- 07-29-2022, 03:41 PM
She should only goto Taiwan if we think the Chinese are serious about their threats to shoot down her aircraft.... Originally Posted by texassapper... Well, she'll need to be careful.
Hillary's plane - on one o' those Foreign trips
came under ground fire... Bad blokes shootin' at
the plane - and H--
... Oh, yes - I almost forgot - THAT was just another LIE
from Hillary.
... Please forget I posted..
#### Salty
- Tiny
- 07-29-2022, 04:30 PM
Who can do more economic damage to who? Then there is "who is better suited at this point to a military conflict" and there is simply no doubt on that since, according to reports,America has lost every war game scenario with China.Good post Hedonist. I enjoyed reading it and you make a lot of sense.
https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/a37158827/us-military-failed-miserably-in-taiwan-invasion-wargame/
The U.S. Military 'Failed Miserably' in a Fake Battle Over Taiwan
The Pentagon has been fighting wars the same way for decades. What happens if someone is taking notes?
The U.S. military reportedly "failed miserably" in a series of wargame scenarios designed to test the Pentagon's might. The flunked exercises, which took place last October, are a red flag that the way the military has operated for years isn't going to fly against today's enemies.
Specifically, a simulated adversary that has studied the American way of war for decades managed to run rings around U.S. forces, defeating them decisively. "They knew exactly what we're going to do before we did it," Gen. John Hyten, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, revealed at an industry event.
While Hyten did not disclose the name of the wargame (it's classifed), he did say that one of the exercises focused exclusively on a brawl between U.S. and Chinese forces fighting over Taiwan—a scenario that seems increasingly likely.
He says there are two main takeaways for the U.S. military. The first involves the concentration of combat power—the American military, like many armed forces, tends to concentrate ships, planes, and ground forces for maximum efficiency and effect. Concentrating forces allows the military to mass firepower, operate more efficiently, and more easily resupply while in the field. In other words, it's easier for everyone on the good guys' side.
But the problem with concentration of mass is that it makes it easier for the enemy to find and kill you. If an enemy knows that American carriers always operate together, for instance, and an enemy discovers one carrier, it then knows a second carrier is close by. By the same token, an Air Force wing of 72 fighter jets operating from a huge, sprawling air base makes it easier to efficiently arm, fuel, and service the fighters, but destroying the base will take out the entire wing. And an Army infantry battalion concentrated in two one-kilometer grid squares is easy to control, but will suffer heavy casualties to artillery barrages.
Another takeaway is that the U.S. military's information dominance is no longer guaranteed, and would probably be in doubt in a future conflict. Since 1991, most of America's enemies have been relatively low-tech armies without the aid of satellites, long-range weapons, cyber forces, or electronic warfare capabilities. As a result, the U.S. military's access to communications, data, and other information has been very secure during wartime, giving friendly forces a huge advantage.
That won't happen in the next war. Potential adversaries Russia and China both have a strong motivation—and more importantly, capability—to attack the Pentagon's information infrastructure. Both countries are aware that U.S. forces are heavily reliant on streams of data, and in a future conflict will attack, jam, and disable the nodes that distribute that information (such as satellites and aircraft-based node) whenever possible.
What does that mean for U.S. forces? Hyten says that the Pentagon is pushing a new concept known as "expanded maneuver," and wants the entire military to adopt it by 2030.
Expanded maneuver is likely exactly what it sounds like—a greater use of mobility to keep U.S. forces out of the enemy's gunsights. Two aircraft carriers, for example, might sail a thousand miles apart while still working together. A wing of fighter jets might be spread out among half a dozen smaller airfields so the destruction of one won't mean the loss of all 72 warplanes. An infantry battalion's subunits might operate farther apart from one another and stay on the move to avoid destruction by enemy artillery.
But what about massing firepower? Long-range weapons can allow widely disparate units to concentrate firepower against an enemy, eliminating the need for close cooperation. Two aircraft carriers might converge on an adversary from different directions, coordinating strikes by using weapons like the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (or JASSM). A wing of fighters might engage enemy aircraft from longer distances using missiles like the upcoming AIM-260 long-range air-to-air missile.
Expanded maneuver will lean more heavily than ever on America's information infrastructure. Commanders in the field will need secure communications and navigation capabilities to coordinate fire and maneuver beyond traditional radio ranges, leaning heavily on satellite and aircraft-relayed communications and data. It's also vitally important that the networks that flow this information are hack-proof.
The battlefield might become a slightly more lonely place for U.S. forces, but that's what it will take to fight and win against a high-tech adversary in the 21st century.
But the good news is, we have more transgender forces and way more pronouns than China. That ought to make you sleep better at night.
It will be a tough pill to swallow but Pelosi should cancel this trip and American should use the time between now and the time China does invade Taiwan, to get our chip manufacturing capabilities back to this country and let China have Taiwan which gives me no great pleasure to say.
Originally Posted by HedonistForever
I may have to rethink my support for WTF’s position on the chip bill. Although I can’t help but think there are ways to support our tech companies that supply our military in ways other than handouts. For example the Ryan/McConnell/Trump corporate tax cut, which made our companies more competitive with the Taiwanese.
- ICU 812
- 07-29-2022, 04:42 PM
Go?
I would say yes . . .and so should a pile of others.
If I were the president, I would now fill Air Force One with as many legislators and officials as I could encourage, threaten or shame into boarding and go on over myself along with the VP. Leave Speaker Pelosi at home to be" the designated survivor!"
I would want to make it so publicly egregious to interfere that the Communist Chinese couldn't do anything. Say they will do port calls in Japan, Philioenes and Singapore etc.
In support, I'd bring as many carrier strike groups into the western Pacific as could be mo ilized on short notice. . . .and the Marines too.
I would say yes . . .and so should a pile of others.
If I were the president, I would now fill Air Force One with as many legislators and officials as I could encourage, threaten or shame into boarding and go on over myself along with the VP. Leave Speaker Pelosi at home to be" the designated survivor!"
I would want to make it so publicly egregious to interfere that the Communist Chinese couldn't do anything. Say they will do port calls in Japan, Philioenes and Singapore etc.
In support, I'd bring as many carrier strike groups into the western Pacific as could be mo ilized on short notice. . . .and the Marines too.
- HedonistForever
- 07-29-2022, 05:38 PM
I've heard a couple of military experts say that with the invention of Hypersonic missiles, China could take out our carriers fairly easily and there isn't a damn thing we can do to stop them. China also has at least 50 more naval vessels than we have.
I get the whole, "let's stand up to the Chinese" but as I learn more and more about this issue, I don't think trying to "save" Taiwan, is in the best interest of the US.
Taiwan isn't a "maybe" will get Taiwan for China. China will get Taiwan and you can put money on that. Xi is about to claim a third term and be elevated to a higher position than he has now but all of that will be in jeopardy if he is humiliated over Taiwan which the CCP is determined to reign in, one way or the other.
I would love to tel China to stick it where the sun don't shine but that will have to be done economically and not militarily. That day has come and gone.
I get the whole, "let's stand up to the Chinese" but as I learn more and more about this issue, I don't think trying to "save" Taiwan, is in the best interest of the US.
Taiwan isn't a "maybe" will get Taiwan for China. China will get Taiwan and you can put money on that. Xi is about to claim a third term and be elevated to a higher position than he has now but all of that will be in jeopardy if he is humiliated over Taiwan which the CCP is determined to reign in, one way or the other.
I would love to tel China to stick it where the sun don't shine but that will have to be done economically and not militarily. That day has come and gone.
- VerySkeptical
- 07-29-2022, 06:21 PM
Bull shit. The article in the link said they lost one set of games
You read too many bull shit "reports" to read real reports that cover all aspects of any true issues. You don't have a clue about the economic impact of losing all the wafer fabs located on Taiwan. Look at the supply chain interruption caused by a shortage of chips. And that comes without a single fab being destroyed. Taiwan is one of the largest concentrations of chip manufacturing in the world. The types of chips made is also very important. Some chips are easier to make than others
Because of that single product, the dynamics of the war are completely changed.
If China just wants the rock, Taiwan is in trouble. If they want the industries (@ 25% of world production of chips) they have to be careful. A single missile hit could shut a fab down for 6-12 months.
I'm not going to waste the huge amount of time it would take to educate you. It's much easier to defend Taiwan than to attack it. All their armor, munitions, and a thousand other things have to come on a ship. Much easier to sink a ship with 100 tanks on it than destroying them on the ground. If they go after civilians, they still have missiles than can hit Beijing. Or the 3 gorges dam.
There are no sure bets in a war like this. Except Chairman Xi won't replace your little red book, your well worn kneepads, and won't let you give up kowtowing.
How long has China controlled your travel and politics?
You must be French.
You read too many bull shit "reports" to read real reports that cover all aspects of any true issues. You don't have a clue about the economic impact of losing all the wafer fabs located on Taiwan. Look at the supply chain interruption caused by a shortage of chips. And that comes without a single fab being destroyed. Taiwan is one of the largest concentrations of chip manufacturing in the world. The types of chips made is also very important. Some chips are easier to make than others
Because of that single product, the dynamics of the war are completely changed.
If China just wants the rock, Taiwan is in trouble. If they want the industries (@ 25% of world production of chips) they have to be careful. A single missile hit could shut a fab down for 6-12 months.
I'm not going to waste the huge amount of time it would take to educate you. It's much easier to defend Taiwan than to attack it. All their armor, munitions, and a thousand other things have to come on a ship. Much easier to sink a ship with 100 tanks on it than destroying them on the ground. If they go after civilians, they still have missiles than can hit Beijing. Or the 3 gorges dam.
There are no sure bets in a war like this. Except Chairman Xi won't replace your little red book, your well worn kneepads, and won't let you give up kowtowing.
How long has China controlled your travel and politics?
You must be French.
Who can do more economic damage to who? Then there is "who is better suited at this point to a military conflict" and there is simply no doubt on that since, according to reports,America has lost every war game scenario with China.
https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/a37158827/us-military-failed-miserably-in-taiwan-invasion-wargame/
The U.S. Military 'Failed Miserably' in a Fake Battle Over Taiwan
The Pentagon has been fighting wars the same way for decades. What happens if someone is taking notes?
The U.S. military reportedly "failed miserably" in a series of wargame scenarios designed to test the Pentagon's might. The flunked exercises, which took place last October, are a red flag that the way the military has operated for years isn't going to fly against today's enemies.
Specifically, a simulated adversary that has studied the American way of war for decades managed to run rings around U.S. forces, defeating them decisively. "They knew exactly what we're going to do before we did it," Gen. John Hyten, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, revealed at an industry event.
While Hyten did not disclose the name of the wargame (it's classifed), he did say that one of the exercises focused exclusively on a brawl between U.S. and Chinese forces fighting over Taiwan—a scenario that seems increasingly likely.
He says there are two main takeaways for the U.S. military. The first involves the concentration of combat power—the American military, like many armed forces, tends to concentrate ships, planes, and ground forces for maximum efficiency and effect. Concentrating forces allows the military to mass firepower, operate more efficiently, and more easily resupply while in the field. In other words, it's easier for everyone on the good guys' side.
But the problem with concentration of mass is that it makes it easier for the enemy to find and kill you. If an enemy knows that American carriers always operate together, for instance, and an enemy discovers one carrier, it then knows a second carrier is close by. By the same token, an Air Force wing of 72 fighter jets operating from a huge, sprawling air base makes it easier to efficiently arm, fuel, and service the fighters, but destroying the base will take out the entire wing. And an Army infantry battalion concentrated in two one-kilometer grid squares is easy to control, but will suffer heavy casualties to artillery barrages.
Another takeaway is that the U.S. military's information dominance is no longer guaranteed, and would probably be in doubt in a future conflict. Since 1991, most of America's enemies have been relatively low-tech armies without the aid of satellites, long-range weapons, cyber forces, or electronic warfare capabilities. As a result, the U.S. military's access to communications, data, and other information has been very secure during wartime, giving friendly forces a huge advantage.
That won't happen in the next war. Potential adversaries Russia and China both have a strong motivation—and more importantly, capability—to attack the Pentagon's information infrastructure. Both countries are aware that U.S. forces are heavily reliant on streams of data, and in a future conflict will attack, jam, and disable the nodes that distribute that information (such as satellites and aircraft-based node) whenever possible.
What does that mean for U.S. forces? Hyten says that the Pentagon is pushing a new concept known as "expanded maneuver," and wants the entire military to adopt it by 2030.
Expanded maneuver is likely exactly what it sounds like—a greater use of mobility to keep U.S. forces out of the enemy's gunsights. Two aircraft carriers, for example, might sail a thousand miles apart while still working together. A wing of fighter jets might be spread out among half a dozen smaller airfields so the destruction of one won't mean the loss of all 72 warplanes. An infantry battalion's subunits might operate farther apart from one another and stay on the move to avoid destruction by enemy artillery.
But what about massing firepower? Long-range weapons can allow widely disparate units to concentrate firepower against an enemy, eliminating the need for close cooperation. Two aircraft carriers might converge on an adversary from different directions, coordinating strikes by using weapons like the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (or JASSM). A wing of fighters might engage enemy aircraft from longer distances using missiles like the upcoming AIM-260 long-range air-to-air missile.
Expanded maneuver will lean more heavily than ever on America's information infrastructure. Commanders in the field will need secure communications and navigation capabilities to coordinate fire and maneuver beyond traditional radio ranges, leaning heavily on satellite and aircraft-relayed communications and data. It's also vitally important that the networks that flow this information are hack-proof.
The battlefield might become a slightly more lonely place for U.S. forces, but that's what it will take to fight and win against a high-tech adversary in the 21st century.
But the good news is, we have more transgender forces and way more pronouns than China. That ought to make you sleep better at night.
It will be a tough pill to swallow but Pelosi should cancel this trip and American should use the time between now and the time China does invade Taiwan, to get our chip manufacturing capabilities back to this country and let China have Taiwan which gives me no great pleasure to say.
Originally Posted by HedonistForever
- Mplay
- 07-29-2022, 07:04 PM
I support any politician visiting Taiwan.
- HedonistForever
- 07-29-2022, 07:32 PM
https://www.yahoo.com/now/were-going-to-lose-fast-us-air-force-held-a-war-game-that-started-with-a-chinese-biological-attack-170003936.html
'We're going to lose fast': U.S. Air Force held a war game that started with a Chinese biological attack
Last fall, the U.S. Air Force simulated a conflict set more than a decade in the future that began with a Chinese biological-weapon attack that swept through U.S. bases and warships in the Indo-Pacific region. Then a major Chinese military exercise was used as cover for the deployment of a massive invasion force. The simulation culminated with Chinese missile strikes raining down on U.S. bases and warships in the region, and a lightning air and amphibious assault on the island of Taiwan.
The highly classified war game, which has not been previously made public, took place less than a year after the coronavirus, reportedly originating in a Chinese market, spread to the crew of the USS Theodore Roosevelt aircraft carrier, taking one of the U.S. Navy’s most significant assets out of commission.
Little wonder that many foreign affairs and national security experts believe the global pandemic has accelerated trends that were already pushing the United States and China toward a potential confrontation as the world’s leading status quo and rising power, respectively. This month the Council on Foreign Relations released a special report, “The United States, China, and Taiwan: A Strategy to Prevent War,” which concluded that Taiwan “is becoming the most dangerous flash point in the world for a possible war” between the United States and China. In Senate testimony on Tuesday, the head of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, Adm. Phil Davidson, warned that he believes China might try and annex Taiwan “in this decade, in fact within the next six years.”
Meanwhile, a leading Chinese think tank recently described tensions in U.S.-China relations as the worst since the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, and it advised Communist Party leaders to prepare for war with the United States.
What many Americans don’t realize is that years of classified Pentagon war games strongly suggest that the U.S. military would lose that war.
“More than a decade ago, our war games indicated that the Chinese were doing a good job of investing in military capabilities that would make our preferred model of expeditionary warfare, where we push forces forward and operate out of relatively safe bases and sanctuaries, increasingly difficult,” Air Force Lt. Gen. S. Clinton Hinote, deputy chief of staff for strategy, integration and requirements, told Yahoo News in an exclusive interview. By 2018, the People’s Liberation Army had fielded many of those forces in large numbers, to include massive arsenals of precision-guided surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missiles, a space-based constellation of navigation and targeting satellites and the largest navy in the world.
“At that point the trend in our war games was not just that we were losing, but we were losing faster,” Hinote said. “After the 2018 war game I distinctly remember one of our gurus of war gaming standing in front of the Air Force secretary and chief of staff, and telling them that we should never play this war game scenario [of a Chinese attack on Taiwan] again, because we know what is going to happen. The definitive answer if the U.S. military doesn’t change course is that we’re going to lose fast. In that case, an American president would likely be presented with almost a fait accompli.”
With Beijing continuing to tighten an iron grip on Hong Kong, engaging in deadly skirmishes with India along their shared border and routinely bullying its smaller neighbors in the South China Sea, the Biden administration recently announced a new Pentagon task force to review U.S. defense policy toward China, to be headed by Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin.
Inevitably, the deteriorating security of Taiwan will be a major focus of the new task force. “By the way, three of China’s standing war plans are built around a Taiwan scenario,” Hinote said. “They’re planning for this. Taiwan is what they think about all the time.”
In the early 2000s, China experts and military analysts at the RAND Corporation were given a trove of classified U.S. intelligence on Beijing’s military plans and weapons programs, and were asked to war-game a confrontation 10 years into the future. China was in the midst of an unprecedented economic growth spurt that saw its GDP increase annually by double digits, with commensurate steep increases in its defense spending. Equally worrisome, the PLA had clearly studied U.S. military operations over the course of two wars against Iraq. Both operations relied on a methodical, months-long buildup of forces to uncontested bases in the region, followed by U.S. aircraft dominating the skies and then carrying out devastating attacks on the enemy’s command-and-control systems.
China’s answer was a well-funded strategy that the Pentagon refers to as “anti-access, area denial” (A2/AD), meaning it would prevent an adversary like the U.S. from being able to carry out the sort of significant military buildup it carried during the two Iraq wars. The PLA’s military plans rely on space-based and airborne surveillance and reconnaissance platforms; massive precision-guided missile arsenals; submarines; militarized man-made islands in the South China Sea; and a host of conventional air and naval forces to hold U.S. and allied bases, ports and warships in the region at risk. Because it lies only 90 miles from Taiwan, China needs only to hold U.S. forces at bay for a matter of weeks to achieve its strategic objective of capturing Taiwan.
“Whenever we war-gamed a Taiwan scenario over the years, our Blue Team routinely got its ass handed to it, because in that scenario time is a precious commodity and it plays to China’s strength in terms of proximity and capabilities,” said David Ochmanek, a senior RAND Corporation analyst and former deputy assistant secretary of defense for force development. “That kind of lopsided defeat is a visceral experience for U.S. officers on the Blue Team, and as such the war games have been a great consciousness-raising device. But the U.S. military is still not keeping pace with Chinese advances. For that reason, I don’t think we’re much better off than a decade ago when we started taking this challenge more seriously.”
Part of the problem is that China advanced its A2/AD strategy while the Pentagon was largely distracted fighting counterterrorism and counterinsurgency wars in Iraq and Afghanistan for two decades. Beijing is also laser-focused on Taiwan and regional hegemony, while the U.S. military must project power and prepare for potential conflict scenarios all around the globe, giving the Pentagon what Ochmanek calls an “attention deficit disorder.” Finally, there is the complacency of the perennial winner that makes it hard for senior U.S. military officers to believe that another nation would dare to take them on.
“My response is that China’s growing military confidence is manifesting itself in an increasingly belligerent approach to its neighbors, the growing frequency of the PLA’s violation of the airspace of Taiwan and Japan, and the bullying of other neighbors in the South China Sea,” said Ochmanek. “Under Xi Jinping there has been a dramatic increase in such provocations compared to a decade ago, and I think it’s grounded in his belief that militarily, China is strong enough now to credibly challenge us.”
By 2017 the Pentagon, led by then-Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis, started to take notice.
“When we were developing the National Defense Strategy in 2017, the trend lines looked very bad vis-à-vis China, and got a lot worse as you projected into the future,” said Elbridge Colby, the former deputy assistant secretary of defense for strategy and force development. “Yet despite that fact there were, and I think still are, a lot of people who resisted the idea that war with China is even possible, let alone losable. That’s why both strategic level and more operational war games were so important. They help show how these things are possible — but also how we can redress the problem.”
In 2018 the Defense Department issued a seminal National Defense Strategy identifying great-power competition with China and Russia, and not terrorism, as the primary challenge to the U.S. After the lopsided Blue Team defeat in the Air Force’s annual war game in 2018, senior officers and defense officials began giving a classified “Overmatch Brief” to select members of Congress.
In the most recent war game, the Pentagon tested the impact of potential capabilities and military concepts that are still on the drawing board in many cases. The Blue Team, which represented U.S. forces, adopted a more defensive and dispersed posture less reliant on large, vulnerable bases, ports and aircraft carriers in a conflict with the Red Team, which represented China.
The strategy strongly favored large numbers of long-range, mobile strike systems, to include anti-ship cruise missile batteries, mobile rocket artillery systems, unmanned mini-submarines, mines and robust surface-to-air missile batteries for air defense. A premium was put on surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities for both early warning and accurate intelligence to enable quicker decisions by U.S. policymakers, and a more capable command-and-control system to coordinate the actions of more dispersed forces.
“We created a force that had resiliency at its core, and the Red Team looked at that force and knew that it would take a tremendous amount of firepower to knock it out,” said Hinote. The biggest insight of the war game, he said, was revealed when he talked afterward with the Red Team leader, who played the role of the PLA’s top general.
“The Red Team leader is the most experienced and aggressive officer in these war games across the Defense Department, and when he initially looked at the resiliency of our defensive posture both in Taiwan and the region, he said, ‘No, I’m not going to attack,’” recalled Hinote. “If we can design a force that creates that level of uncertainty and causes Chinese leaders to question whether they can accomplish their goals militarily, I think that’s what deterrence looks like in the future.”
Despite loud alarms raised by the war games, the Pentagon has been slow to adjust its long-term spending plans or to invest in the kinds of military capabilities necessary to defend Taiwan or contested island chains in the South China Sea. Instead, older weapons systems like massive warships, short-range tactical fighter aircraft and heavy tank battalions continue to enjoy support from loyal constituencies both inside the Pentagon and in Congress. What’s needed, experts say, are bolder actions like the Marine Corps’ recent decision to completely divest itself of tanks and heavy armor by 2030 in order to invest in anti-ship missiles and mobile strike teams optimized for a conflict with China.
On a sober note, Hinote pointed out that the Blue Team force posture tested in the recent war game is still not the one reflected in current Defense Department spending plans. “We’re beginning to understand what kind of U.S. military force it’s going to take to achieve the National Defense Strategy’s goals,” he said. “But that’s not the force we’re planning and building today.”
https://www.wearethemighty.com/mighty-trending/us-losing-simulated-war-games/
US has been losing simulated war games against Russia & China
US networks and systems crumble
'We're going to lose fast': U.S. Air Force held a war game that started with a Chinese biological attack
Last fall, the U.S. Air Force simulated a conflict set more than a decade in the future that began with a Chinese biological-weapon attack that swept through U.S. bases and warships in the Indo-Pacific region. Then a major Chinese military exercise was used as cover for the deployment of a massive invasion force. The simulation culminated with Chinese missile strikes raining down on U.S. bases and warships in the region, and a lightning air and amphibious assault on the island of Taiwan.
The highly classified war game, which has not been previously made public, took place less than a year after the coronavirus, reportedly originating in a Chinese market, spread to the crew of the USS Theodore Roosevelt aircraft carrier, taking one of the U.S. Navy’s most significant assets out of commission.
Little wonder that many foreign affairs and national security experts believe the global pandemic has accelerated trends that were already pushing the United States and China toward a potential confrontation as the world’s leading status quo and rising power, respectively. This month the Council on Foreign Relations released a special report, “The United States, China, and Taiwan: A Strategy to Prevent War,” which concluded that Taiwan “is becoming the most dangerous flash point in the world for a possible war” between the United States and China. In Senate testimony on Tuesday, the head of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, Adm. Phil Davidson, warned that he believes China might try and annex Taiwan “in this decade, in fact within the next six years.”
Meanwhile, a leading Chinese think tank recently described tensions in U.S.-China relations as the worst since the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, and it advised Communist Party leaders to prepare for war with the United States.
What many Americans don’t realize is that years of classified Pentagon war games strongly suggest that the U.S. military would lose that war.
“More than a decade ago, our war games indicated that the Chinese were doing a good job of investing in military capabilities that would make our preferred model of expeditionary warfare, where we push forces forward and operate out of relatively safe bases and sanctuaries, increasingly difficult,” Air Force Lt. Gen. S. Clinton Hinote, deputy chief of staff for strategy, integration and requirements, told Yahoo News in an exclusive interview. By 2018, the People’s Liberation Army had fielded many of those forces in large numbers, to include massive arsenals of precision-guided surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missiles, a space-based constellation of navigation and targeting satellites and the largest navy in the world.
“At that point the trend in our war games was not just that we were losing, but we were losing faster,” Hinote said. “After the 2018 war game I distinctly remember one of our gurus of war gaming standing in front of the Air Force secretary and chief of staff, and telling them that we should never play this war game scenario [of a Chinese attack on Taiwan] again, because we know what is going to happen. The definitive answer if the U.S. military doesn’t change course is that we’re going to lose fast. In that case, an American president would likely be presented with almost a fait accompli.”
With Beijing continuing to tighten an iron grip on Hong Kong, engaging in deadly skirmishes with India along their shared border and routinely bullying its smaller neighbors in the South China Sea, the Biden administration recently announced a new Pentagon task force to review U.S. defense policy toward China, to be headed by Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin.
Inevitably, the deteriorating security of Taiwan will be a major focus of the new task force. “By the way, three of China’s standing war plans are built around a Taiwan scenario,” Hinote said. “They’re planning for this. Taiwan is what they think about all the time.”
In the early 2000s, China experts and military analysts at the RAND Corporation were given a trove of classified U.S. intelligence on Beijing’s military plans and weapons programs, and were asked to war-game a confrontation 10 years into the future. China was in the midst of an unprecedented economic growth spurt that saw its GDP increase annually by double digits, with commensurate steep increases in its defense spending. Equally worrisome, the PLA had clearly studied U.S. military operations over the course of two wars against Iraq. Both operations relied on a methodical, months-long buildup of forces to uncontested bases in the region, followed by U.S. aircraft dominating the skies and then carrying out devastating attacks on the enemy’s command-and-control systems.
China’s answer was a well-funded strategy that the Pentagon refers to as “anti-access, area denial” (A2/AD), meaning it would prevent an adversary like the U.S. from being able to carry out the sort of significant military buildup it carried during the two Iraq wars. The PLA’s military plans rely on space-based and airborne surveillance and reconnaissance platforms; massive precision-guided missile arsenals; submarines; militarized man-made islands in the South China Sea; and a host of conventional air and naval forces to hold U.S. and allied bases, ports and warships in the region at risk. Because it lies only 90 miles from Taiwan, China needs only to hold U.S. forces at bay for a matter of weeks to achieve its strategic objective of capturing Taiwan.
“Whenever we war-gamed a Taiwan scenario over the years, our Blue Team routinely got its ass handed to it, because in that scenario time is a precious commodity and it plays to China’s strength in terms of proximity and capabilities,” said David Ochmanek, a senior RAND Corporation analyst and former deputy assistant secretary of defense for force development. “That kind of lopsided defeat is a visceral experience for U.S. officers on the Blue Team, and as such the war games have been a great consciousness-raising device. But the U.S. military is still not keeping pace with Chinese advances. For that reason, I don’t think we’re much better off than a decade ago when we started taking this challenge more seriously.”
Part of the problem is that China advanced its A2/AD strategy while the Pentagon was largely distracted fighting counterterrorism and counterinsurgency wars in Iraq and Afghanistan for two decades. Beijing is also laser-focused on Taiwan and regional hegemony, while the U.S. military must project power and prepare for potential conflict scenarios all around the globe, giving the Pentagon what Ochmanek calls an “attention deficit disorder.” Finally, there is the complacency of the perennial winner that makes it hard for senior U.S. military officers to believe that another nation would dare to take them on.
“My response is that China’s growing military confidence is manifesting itself in an increasingly belligerent approach to its neighbors, the growing frequency of the PLA’s violation of the airspace of Taiwan and Japan, and the bullying of other neighbors in the South China Sea,” said Ochmanek. “Under Xi Jinping there has been a dramatic increase in such provocations compared to a decade ago, and I think it’s grounded in his belief that militarily, China is strong enough now to credibly challenge us.”
By 2017 the Pentagon, led by then-Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis, started to take notice.
“When we were developing the National Defense Strategy in 2017, the trend lines looked very bad vis-à-vis China, and got a lot worse as you projected into the future,” said Elbridge Colby, the former deputy assistant secretary of defense for strategy and force development. “Yet despite that fact there were, and I think still are, a lot of people who resisted the idea that war with China is even possible, let alone losable. That’s why both strategic level and more operational war games were so important. They help show how these things are possible — but also how we can redress the problem.”
In 2018 the Defense Department issued a seminal National Defense Strategy identifying great-power competition with China and Russia, and not terrorism, as the primary challenge to the U.S. After the lopsided Blue Team defeat in the Air Force’s annual war game in 2018, senior officers and defense officials began giving a classified “Overmatch Brief” to select members of Congress.
In the most recent war game, the Pentagon tested the impact of potential capabilities and military concepts that are still on the drawing board in many cases. The Blue Team, which represented U.S. forces, adopted a more defensive and dispersed posture less reliant on large, vulnerable bases, ports and aircraft carriers in a conflict with the Red Team, which represented China.
The strategy strongly favored large numbers of long-range, mobile strike systems, to include anti-ship cruise missile batteries, mobile rocket artillery systems, unmanned mini-submarines, mines and robust surface-to-air missile batteries for air defense. A premium was put on surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities for both early warning and accurate intelligence to enable quicker decisions by U.S. policymakers, and a more capable command-and-control system to coordinate the actions of more dispersed forces.
“We created a force that had resiliency at its core, and the Red Team looked at that force and knew that it would take a tremendous amount of firepower to knock it out,” said Hinote. The biggest insight of the war game, he said, was revealed when he talked afterward with the Red Team leader, who played the role of the PLA’s top general.
“The Red Team leader is the most experienced and aggressive officer in these war games across the Defense Department, and when he initially looked at the resiliency of our defensive posture both in Taiwan and the region, he said, ‘No, I’m not going to attack,’” recalled Hinote. “If we can design a force that creates that level of uncertainty and causes Chinese leaders to question whether they can accomplish their goals militarily, I think that’s what deterrence looks like in the future.”
Despite loud alarms raised by the war games, the Pentagon has been slow to adjust its long-term spending plans or to invest in the kinds of military capabilities necessary to defend Taiwan or contested island chains in the South China Sea. Instead, older weapons systems like massive warships, short-range tactical fighter aircraft and heavy tank battalions continue to enjoy support from loyal constituencies both inside the Pentagon and in Congress. What’s needed, experts say, are bolder actions like the Marine Corps’ recent decision to completely divest itself of tanks and heavy armor by 2030 in order to invest in anti-ship missiles and mobile strike teams optimized for a conflict with China.
On a sober note, Hinote pointed out that the Blue Team force posture tested in the recent war game is still not the one reflected in current Defense Department spending plans. “We’re beginning to understand what kind of U.S. military force it’s going to take to achieve the National Defense Strategy’s goals,” he said. “But that’s not the force we’re planning and building today.”
https://www.wearethemighty.com/mighty-trending/us-losing-simulated-war-games/
US has been losing simulated war games against Russia & China
In war games simulating a high-end fight against Russia or China, the US often loses, two experienced military war-gamers have revealed.
“We lose a lot of people. We lose a lot of equipment. We usually fail to achieve our objective of preventing aggression by the adversary,” he said.
US stealth fighters die on the runway“We lose a lot of people. We lose a lot of equipment. We usually fail to achieve our objective of preventing aggression by the adversary,” he said.
At the outset of these conflicts, all five battlefield domains — land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace — are contested, meaning the US could struggle to achieve the superiority it has enjoyed in the past.
In these simulated fights, the “red” aggressor force often obliterates US stealth fighters on the runway, sends US warships to the depths, destroys US bases, and takes out critical US military systems.
“In every case I know of, the F-35 rules the sky when it’s in the sky,” Robert Work, a former deputy secretary of defense and an experienced war-gamer, said March 7, 2019. “But it gets killed on the ground in large numbers.”
Neither China nor Russia has developed a fifth-generation fighter as capable as the F-35, but even the best aircraft have to land. That leaves them vulnerable to attack.
US warships are wiped off the boardIn these simulated fights, the “red” aggressor force often obliterates US stealth fighters on the runway, sends US warships to the depths, destroys US bases, and takes out critical US military systems.
“In every case I know of, the F-35 rules the sky when it’s in the sky,” Robert Work, a former deputy secretary of defense and an experienced war-gamer, said March 7, 2019. “But it gets killed on the ground in large numbers.”
Neither China nor Russia has developed a fifth-generation fighter as capable as the F-35, but even the best aircraft have to land. That leaves them vulnerable to attack.
“Things that sail on the surface of the sea are going to have a hard time,” Ochmanek said.
Aircraft carriers, traditional beacons of American military might, are becoming increasingly vulnerable. They may be hard to kill, but they are significantly less difficult to take out of the fight.
Naval experts estimate that US aircraft carriers now need to operate at least 1,000 nautical miles from the Chinese mainland to keep out of range of China’s anti-ship missiles, according to USNI News.
US bases burnAircraft carriers, traditional beacons of American military might, are becoming increasingly vulnerable. They may be hard to kill, but they are significantly less difficult to take out of the fight.
Naval experts estimate that US aircraft carriers now need to operate at least 1,000 nautical miles from the Chinese mainland to keep out of range of China’s anti-ship missiles, according to USNI News.
US networks and systems crumble
In a conflict against a near-peer threat, US communications satellites, command-and-control systems, and wireless networks would be crippled.
The Chinese would “attack the American battle network at all levels, relentlessly, and they practice it all the time,” Work said. “On our side, whenever we have an exercise, when the red force really destroys our command and control, we stop the exercise and say, ‘let’s restart.'”
A sobering assessmentThe Chinese would “attack the American battle network at all levels, relentlessly, and they practice it all the time,” Work said. “On our side, whenever we have an exercise, when the red force really destroys our command and control, we stop the exercise and say, ‘let’s restart.'”
“These are the things that the war games show over and over and over, so we need a new American way of war without question,” Work stressed.
“If the United States had to fight Russia in a Baltic contingency or China in a war over Taiwan, Americans could face a decisive military defeat,” the National Defense Strategy Commission — a bipartisan panel of experts picked by Congress to evaluate the National Defense Strategy — said in a November 2018 report.
The report called attention to the erosion of the US’s military edge by rival powers, namely Russia and China, which have developed a “suite of advanced capabilities heretofore possessed only by the United States.”
US military vulnerabilities exposed during classified war game, top general says“If the United States had to fight Russia in a Baltic contingency or China in a war over Taiwan, Americans could face a decisive military defeat,” the National Defense Strategy Commission — a bipartisan panel of experts picked by Congress to evaluate the National Defense Strategy — said in a November 2018 report.
The report called attention to the erosion of the US’s military edge by rival powers, namely Russia and China, which have developed a “suite of advanced capabilities heretofore possessed only by the United States.”
The commission concluded the US is “at greater risk than at any time in decades.”
The U.S. military was crippled during a classified war game last year that exposed vulnerabilities the Pentagon is trying to fix, should it ever face off against a sophisticated adversary like China, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs said this week.
“Without overstating the issue, it failed miserably,” Gen. John Hyten said of the battle plan during the October exercise, which he detailed Monday at the Emerging Technologies Institute in Washington.
The biggest problem occurred when communication networks came under attack. During the drill, a Pentagon “red team” playing the enemy role “ran rings around us,” Hyten said. “They knew exactly what we were going to do before we did it.
“Without overstating the issue, it failed miserably,” Gen. John Hyten said of the battle plan during the October exercise, which he detailed Monday at the Emerging Technologies Institute in Washington.
The biggest problem occurred when communication networks came under attack. During the drill, a Pentagon “red team” playing the enemy role “ran rings around us,” Hyten said. “They knew exactly what we were going to do before we did it.