Talk about treasonous acts...Bullosey and woke kook Milhead conspired to defy the Commander and Chief!!

This woke prick Milhead would go around the president in the case of a attack on the chicoms...he told him "I have your back!! HE SHOULD HAVE BEEN FIRED FOR INSUBORDINATION...the worthless PICK. Liberalism is a gutless choice and danger to the entire world. These article are from the Commie New Network and the Washed Out Post

Talk About a Coup: It Was Pelosi Who Pushed Milley to Act Against Trump
By Nick Arama | Sep 14, 2021 5:00 PM ET


https://twitter.com/JerryDunleavy/st...-trump-n442936

There’s an incredible report that broke today about improper actions by Gen. Mark Milley after the Capitol riot.

According to the report, Milley tried to interfere with Trump’s ability to solely control a nuclear decision.


From CNN:

“You never know what a president’s trigger point is,” Milley told his senior staff, according to the book.

In response, Milley took extraordinary action, and called a secret meeting in his Pentagon office on January 8 to review the process for military action, including launching nuclear weapons. Speaking to senior military officials in charge of the National Military Command Center, the Pentagon’s war room, Milley instructed them not to take orders from anyone unless he was involved.

“No matter what you are told, you do the procedure. You do the process. And I’m part of that procedure,” Milley told the officers, according to the book. He then went around the room, looked each officer in the eye, and asked them to verbally confirm they understood.

This, of course, is a brazenly improper action as only the president can dictate the nuclear use and Milley was trying to do an end-run around him with this.

On top of that, as we reported earlier, Milley allegedly contacted his Chinese counterpart and told him he would warn him if we were going to attack — another astonishingly improper action which was reportedly done without the knowledge of President Donald Trump.

Now there are a lot of things we can call that — bordering on treason might be one of them. But at the least, he should be booted as Joint Chiefs Chair for that reason alone, not to mention the horrible debacle he left in Afghanistan.

But if you’ve been following along here, you may remember another story I wrote back on Jan. 9. Milley’s improper actions followed a call from House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) who wanted Milley to stand in the way of Trump taking any military action. As I wrote at the time, she was effectively trying to foment a coup against the legally elected president of the U.S. and interfere with his military power, when she had no ability to do so. It doesn’t matter what they think or their politics, they were acting against the president of the United States and his duly-given constitutional power.

https://twitter.com/ColumbiaBugle/st...-trump-n442936

From CNN:

Pelosi pushed back.

“What I’m saying to you is that if they couldn’t even stop him from an assault on the Capitol, who even knows what else he may do? And is there anybody in charge at the White House who was doing anything but kissing his fat butt all over this?”

Pelosi continued, “You know he’s crazy. He’s been crazy for a long time.”

According to Woodward and Costa, Milley responded, “Madam Speaker, I agree with you on everything.”

After the call, Milley decided he had to act. He told his top service chiefs to watch everything “all the time.” He called the director of the National Security Agency, Paul Nakasone, and told him, “Needles up … keep watching, scan.” And he told then-CIA Director Gina Haspel, “Aggressively watch everything, 360.”

After the call, then Milley took action to make any nuclear decisions have to go through him.

Then there was this report on Jan. 8.

https://twitter.com/CNN/status/13477...-trump-n442936

So, in other words, Pelosi was indeed fomenting a coup with the military against Trump, and Milley actually took concrete steps to interfere with that presidential authority.

They were committing the very insurrection/coup of which they accused Trump. Will the GOP finally act on this? This is intolerable and completely unconstitutional.

should be brought up on sedition charges - both nazi pelosi and woke milley!
But - the subverted fiden DOJ only prosecutes conservatives/republicans.

The double standard will be teh death of the union of States!

should be brought up on sedition charges - both nazi pelosi and woke milley!
But - the subverted fiden DOJ only prosecutes conservatives/republicans.

The double standard will be teh death of the union of States! Originally Posted by oeb11

ob it's treason when you conspire the the chicoms...

§2381. Treason
Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States, levies war against them or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the United States or elsewhere, is guilty of treason and shall suffer death, or shall be imprisoned not less than five years and fined under this title but not less than $10,000; and shall be incapable of holding any office under the United States.

Not commenting as a constitutional lawyer - I understand that a declared state of War is necessary for a charge of Treason.
Sedition is a reasonable charge

open for One with better knowledge - a thought posted below.

https://constitution.congress.gov/br...III_S3_C1_1_2/

ArtIII.S3.C1.1.2 Treason Clause: Doctrine and Practice

Article III, Section 3, Clause 1:
Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.
Levying War

Early judicial interpretation of the meaning of treason in terms of levying war was conditioned by the partisan struggles of the early nineteenth century, which involved the treason trials of Aaron Burr and his associates. In Ex parte Bollman,1 which involved two of Burr's confederates, Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for himself and three other Justices, confined the meaning of levying war to the actual waging of war. However flagitious may be the crime of conspiring to subvert by force the government of our country, such conspiracy is not treason. To conspire to levy war, and actually to levy war, are distinct offences. The first must be brought into open action by the assemblage of men for a purpose treasonable in itself, or the fact of levying war cannot have been committed. So far has this principle been carried, that . . . it has been determined that the actual enlistment of men to serve against the government does not amount to levying war. Chief Justice Marshall was careful, however, to state that the Court did not mean that no person could be guilty of this crime who had not appeared in arms against the country. On the contrary, if war be actually levied, that is, if a body of men be actually assembled for the purpose of effecting by force a treasonable purpose, all those who perform any part, however minute, or however remote from the scene of action, and who are actually leagued in the general conspiracy, are to be considered as traitors. But there must be an actual assembling of men, for the treasonable purpose, to constitute a levying of war.2
On the basis of these considerations and because no part of the crime charged had been committed in the District of Columbia, the Court held that Bollman and Swartwout could not be tried in the District, and ordered their discharge. Marshall continued by saying that the crime of treason should not be extended by construction to doubtful cases and concluded that no conspiracy for overturning the Government and no enlisting of men to effect it, would be an actual levying of war.3
The Burr Trial

Not long afterward, the Chief Justice went to Richmond to preside over the trial of Aaron Burr. His ruling4 denying a motion to introduce certain collateral evidence bearing on Burr's activities is significant both for rendering the latter's acquittal inevitable and for the qualifications and exceptions made to the Bollman decision. In brief, this ruling held that Burr, who had not been present at the assemblage on Blennerhassett's Island, could be convicted of advising or procuring a levying of war only upon the testimony of two witnesses to his having procured the assemblage. This operation having been covert, such testimony was naturally unobtainable. The net effect of Marshall's pronouncements was to make it extremely difficult to convict one of levying war against the United States short of the conduct of or personal participation in actual hostilities.5
Aid and Comfort to the Enemy

The Cramer Case

Since Bollman, the few treason cases that have reached the Supreme Court were outgrowths of World War II and have charged adherence to enemies of the United States and the giving of aid and comfort. In the first of these, Cramer v. United States,6 the issue was whether the overt act had to be openly manifest treason or if it was enough if, when supported by the proper evidence, it showed the required treasonable intention.7 The Court, in a five-to-four opinion by Justice Jackson, in effect took the former view holding that the two-witness principle interdicted imputation of incriminating acts to the accused by circumstantial evidence or by the testimony of a single witness,8 even though the single witness in question was the accused himself. Every act, movement, deed, and word of the defendant charged to constitute treason must be supported by the testimony of two witnesses,9 Justice Jackson asserted. Justice Douglas in a dissent, in which Chief Justice Stone and Justices Black and Reed concurred, contended that Cramer's treasonable intention was sufficiently shown by overt acts as attested to by two witnesses each, plus statements made by Cramer on the witness stand.
The Haupt Case

The Supreme Court sustained a conviction of treason, for the first time in its history, in 1947 in Haupt v. United States.10 Here it was held that although the overt acts relied upon to support the charge of treason – defendant's harboring and sheltering in his home his son who was an enemy spy and saboteur, assisting him in purchasing an automobile, and in obtaining employment in a defense plant—were all acts which a father would naturally perform for a son, this fact did not necessarily relieve them of the treasonable purpose of giving aid and comfort to the enemy. Speaking for the Court, Justice Jackson said: No matter whether young Haupt's mission was benign or traitorous, known or unknown to the defendant, these acts were aid and comfort to him. In the light of this mission and his instructions, they were more than casually useful; they were aids in steps essential to his design for treason. If proof be added that the defendant knew of his son's instruction, preparation and plans, the purpose to aid and comfort the enemy becomes clear.11
The Court held that conversation and occurrences long prior to the indictment were admissible evidence on the question of defendant's intent. And more important, it held that the constitutional requirement of two witnesses to the same overt act or confession in open court does not operate to exclude confessions or admissions made out of court, where a legal basis for the conviction has been laid by the testimony of two witnesses of which such confessions or admissions are merely corroborative. This relaxation of restrictions surrounding the definition of treason evoked obvious satisfaction from Justice Douglas, who saw in Haupt a vindication of his position in Cramer. His concurring opinion contains what may be called a restatement of the law of treason and merits quotation at length:
As the Cramer case makes plain, the overt act and the intent with which it is done are separate and distinct elements of the crime. Intent need not be proved by two witnesses but may be inferred from all the circumstances surrounding the overt act. But if two witnesses are not required to prove treasonable intent, two witnesses need not be required to show the treasonable character of the overt act. For proof of treasonable intent in the doing of the overt act necessarily involves proof that the accused committed the overt act with the knowledge or understanding of its treasonable character.
The requirement of an overt act is to make certain a treasonable project has moved from the realm of thought into the realm of action. That requirement is undeniably met in the present case, as it was in the case of Cramer.
The Cramer case departed from those rules when it held that ‘The two-witness principle is to interdict imputation of incriminating acts to the accused by circumstantial evidence or by the testimony of a single witness.' 325 U.S. at 35. The present decision is truer to the constitutional definition of treason when it forsakes that test and holds that an act, quite innocent on its face, does not need two witnesses to be transformed into a incriminating one. 12
The Kawakita Case

Kawakita v. United States13 was decided on June 2, 1952. The facts are sufficiently stated in the following headnote: At petitioner's trial for treason, it appeared that originally he was a native-born citizen of the United States and also a national of Japan by reason of Japanese parentage and law. While a minor, he took the oath of allegiance to the United States; went to Japan for a visit on an American passport; and was prevented by the outbreak of war from returning to this country. During the war, he reached his majority in Japan; changed his registration from American to Japanese, showed sympathy with Japan and hostility to the United States; served as a civilian employee of a private corporation producing war materials for Japan; and brutally abused American prisoners of war who were forced to work there. After Japan's surrender, he registered as an American citizen; swore that he was an American citizen and had not done various acts amounting to expatriation; and returned to this country on an American passport. The question whether, on this record, Kawakita had intended to renounce American citizenship, said the Court, in sustaining conviction, was peculiarly one for the jury and their verdict that he had not so intended was based on sufficient evidence. An American citizen, it continued, owes allegiance to the United States wherever he may reside, and dual nationality does not alter the situation.14
Doubtful State of the Law of Treason Today

The vacillation of Chief Justice Marshall between the Bollman15 and Burr16 cases and the vacillation of the Court in the Cramer17 and Haupt18 cases leave the law of treason in a somewhat doubtful condition. The difficulties created by Burr have been obviated to a considerable extent through the punishment of acts ordinarily treasonable in nature under a different label,19 within a formula provided by Chief Justice Marshall himself in Bollman. The passage reads: Crimes so atrocious as those which have for their object the subversion by violence of those laws and those institutions which have been ordained in order to secure the peace and happiness of society, are not to escape punishment, because they have not ripened into treason. The wisdom of the legislature is competent to provide for the case; and the framers of our Constitution . . . must have conceived it more safe that punishment in such cases should be ordained by general laws, formed upon deliberation, under the influence of no resentments, and without knowing on whom they were to operate, than that it should be inflicted under the influence of those passions which the occasion seldom fails to excite, and which a flexible definition of the crime, or a construction which would render it flexible, might bring into operation.20

Topics

• Citizenship
• Prisoners
• Supreme Court
• War

Footnotes

1. Jump to essay-18 U.S. (4 Cr.) 75 (1807).
2. Jump to essay-28 U.S. at 126.
3. Jump to essay-38 U.S. at 127.
4. Jump to essay-4United States v. Burr, 8 U.S. (4 Cr.) 469, Appx. (1807).
5. Jump to essay-5There have been lower court cases in which convictions were obtained. As a result of the Whiskey Rebellion, convictions of treason were obtained on the basis of the ruling that forcible resistance to the enforcement of the revenue laws was a constructive levying of war. United States v. Vigol, 29 F. Cas. 376 (No. 16621) (C.C.D. Pa. 1795); United States v. Mitchell, 26 F. Cas. 1277 (No. 15788) (C.C.D. Pa. 1795). After conviction, the defendants were pardoned. See also for the same ruling in a different situation the Case of Fries, 9 F. Cas. 826, 924 (Nos. 5126, 5127) (C.C.D. Pa. 1799, 1800). The defendant was again pardoned after conviction. About a half century later participation in forcible resistance to the Fugitive Slave Law was held not to be a constructive levying of war. United States v. Hanway, 26 F. Cas. 105 (No. 15299) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1851). Although the United States Government regarded the activities of the Confederate States as a levying of war, the President by Amnesty Proclamation of December 25, 1868, pardoned all those who had participated on the southern side in the Civil War. In applying the Captured and Abandoned Property Act of 1863 (12 Stat. 820) in a civil proceeding, the Court declared that the foundation of the Confederacy was treason against the United States. Sprott v. United States, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 459 (1875). See also Hanauer v. Doane, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 342 (1871); Thorington v. Smith, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 1 (1869); Young v. United States, 97 U.S. 39 (1878). These four cases bring in the concept of adhering to the enemy and giving him aid and comfort, but these are not criminal cases and deal with attempts to recover property under the Captured and Abandoned Property Act by persons who claimed that they had given no aid or comfort to the enemy. These cases are not, therefore, an interpretation of the Constitution.
6. Jump to essay-6325 U.S. 1 (1945).
7. Jump to essay-789 Law. Ed. 1443-1444 (Argument of Counsel).
8. Jump to essay-8325 U.S. at 35.
9. Jump to essay-9325 U.S. at 34–35. Earlier, Justice Jackson had declared that this phase of treason consists of two elements: adherence to the enemy; and rendering him aid and comfort. A citizen, it was said, may take actions which do aid and comfort the enemy . . . but if there is no adherence to the enemy in this, if there is no intent to betray, there is no treason. Id. at 29. Justice Jackson states erroneously that the requirement of two witnesses to the same overt act was an original invention of the Convention of 1787. Actually it comes from the British Treason Trials Act of 1695. 7 Wm. III, c.3.
10. Jump to essay-10330 U.S. 631 (1947).
11. Jump to essay-11330 U.S. at 635–36.
12. Jump to essay-12330 U.S. at 645–46. Justice Douglas cites no cases for these propositions. Justice Murphy in a solitary dissent stated: But the act of providing shelter was of the type that might naturally arise out of petitioner's relationship to his son, as the Court recognizes. By its very nature, therefore, it is a non-treasonous act. That is true even when the act is viewed in light of all the surrounding circumstances. All that can be said is that the problem of whether it was motivated by treasonous or non-treasonous factors is left in doubt. It is therefore not an overt act of treason, regardless of how unlawful it might otherwise be. Id. at 649.
13. Jump to essay-13343 U.S. 717 (1952).
14. Jump to essay-14343 U.S. at 732. For citations in the subject of dual nationality, see id. at 723 n.2. Three dissenters asserted that Kawakita's conduct in Japan clearly showed he was consistently demonstrating his allegiance to Japan. As a matter of law, he expatriated himself as well as that can be done. Id. at 746.
15. Jump to essay-15Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cr.) 75 (1807).
16. Jump to essay-16United States v. Burr, 8 U.S. (4 Cr.) 469 (1807).
17. Jump to essay-17Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1 (1945).
18. Jump to essay-18Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631 (1947).
19. Jump to essay-19Cf. United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583 (2d. Cir. 1952), cert denied, 344 U.S. 889 (1952), holding that in a prosecution under the Espionage Act for giving aid to a country, not an enemy, an offense distinct from treason, neither the two-witness rule nor the requirement as to the overt act is applicable.
20. Jump to essay-20Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cr.) 75, 126, 127 (1807). Justice Frankfurter appended to his opinion in Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 25 n.38 (1945), a list taken from the government's brief of all the cases prior to Cramer in which construction of the Treason Clause was involved. The same list, updated, appears in J. Hurst, supra at 260-67. Professor Hurst was responsible for the historical research underlying the government's brief in Cramer.

ledge to comment.

Not commenting as a constitutional lawyer - I understand that a declared state of War is necessary for a charge of Treason.
Sedition is a reasonable charge

open for One with better knowledge - a thought posted below.

https://constitution.congress.gov/br...III_S3_C1_1_2/

ArtIII.S3.C1.1.2 Treason Clause: Doctrine and Practice

Article III, Section 3, Clause 1:
Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.
Levying War

Early judicial interpretation of the meaning of treason in terms of levying war was conditioned by the partisan struggles of the early nineteenth century, which involved the treason trials of Aaron Burr and his associates. In Ex parte Bollman,1 which involved two of Burr's confederates, Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for himself and three other Justices, confined the meaning of levying war to the actual waging of war. However flagitious may be the crime of conspiring to subvert by force the government of our country, such conspiracy is not treason. To conspire to levy war, and actually to levy war, are distinct offences. The first must be brought into open action by the assemblage of men for a purpose treasonable in itself, or the fact of levying war cannot have been committed. So far has this principle been carried, that . . . it has been determined that the actual enlistment of men to serve against the government does not amount to levying war. Chief Justice Marshall was careful, however, to state that the Court did not mean that no person could be guilty of this crime who had not appeared in arms against the country. On the contrary, if war be actually levied, that is, if a body of men be actually assembled for the purpose of effecting by force a treasonable purpose, all those who perform any part, however minute, or however remote from the scene of action, and who are actually leagued in the general conspiracy, are to be considered as traitors. But there must be an actual assembling of men, for the treasonable purpose, to constitute a levying of war.2
On the basis of these considerations and because no part of the crime charged had been committed in the District of Columbia, the Court held that Bollman and Swartwout could not be tried in the District, and ordered their discharge. Marshall continued by saying that the crime of treason should not be extended by construction to doubtful cases and concluded that no conspiracy for overturning the Government and no enlisting of men to effect it, would be an actual levying of war.3
The Burr Trial

Not long afterward, the Chief Justice went to Richmond to preside over the trial of Aaron Burr. His ruling4 denying a motion to introduce certain collateral evidence bearing on Burr's activities is significant both for rendering the latter's acquittal inevitable and for the qualifications and exceptions made to the Bollman decision. In brief, this ruling held that Burr, who had not been present at the assemblage on Blennerhassett's Island, could be convicted of advising or procuring a levying of war only upon the testimony of two witnesses to his having procured the assemblage. This operation having been covert, such testimony was naturally unobtainable. The net effect of Marshall's pronouncements was to make it extremely difficult to convict one of levying war against the United States short of the conduct of or personal participation in actual hostilities.5
Aid and Comfort to the Enemy

The Cramer Case

Since Bollman, the few treason cases that have reached the Supreme Court were outgrowths of World War II and have charged adherence to enemies of the United States and the giving of aid and comfort. In the first of these, Cramer v. United States,6 the issue was whether the overt act had to be openly manifest treason or if it was enough if, when supported by the proper evidence, it showed the required treasonable intention.7 The Court, in a five-to-four opinion by Justice Jackson, in effect took the former view holding that the two-witness principle interdicted imputation of incriminating acts to the accused by circumstantial evidence or by the testimony of a single witness,8 even though the single witness in question was the accused himself. Every act, movement, deed, and word of the defendant charged to constitute treason must be supported by the testimony of two witnesses,9 Justice Jackson asserted. Justice Douglas in a dissent, in which Chief Justice Stone and Justices Black and Reed concurred, contended that Cramer's treasonable intention was sufficiently shown by overt acts as attested to by two witnesses each, plus statements made by Cramer on the witness stand.
The Haupt Case

The Supreme Court sustained a conviction of treason, for the first time in its history, in 1947 in Haupt v. United States.10 Here it was held that although the overt acts relied upon to support the charge of treason – defendant's harboring and sheltering in his home his son who was an enemy spy and saboteur, assisting him in purchasing an automobile, and in obtaining employment in a defense plant—were all acts which a father would naturally perform for a son, this fact did not necessarily relieve them of the treasonable purpose of giving aid and comfort to the enemy. Speaking for the Court, Justice Jackson said: No matter whether young Haupt's mission was benign or traitorous, known or unknown to the defendant, these acts were aid and comfort to him. In the light of this mission and his instructions, they were more than casually useful; they were aids in steps essential to his design for treason. If proof be added that the defendant knew of his son's instruction, preparation and plans, the purpose to aid and comfort the enemy becomes clear.11
The Court held that conversation and occurrences long prior to the indictment were admissible evidence on the question of defendant's intent. And more important, it held that the constitutional requirement of two witnesses to the same overt act or confession in open court does not operate to exclude confessions or admissions made out of court, where a legal basis for the conviction has been laid by the testimony of two witnesses of which such confessions or admissions are merely corroborative. This relaxation of restrictions surrounding the definition of treason evoked obvious satisfaction from Justice Douglas, who saw in Haupt a vindication of his position in Cramer. His concurring opinion contains what may be called a restatement of the law of treason and merits quotation at length:
As the Cramer case makes plain, the overt act and the intent with which it is done are separate and distinct elements of the crime. Intent need not be proved by two witnesses but may be inferred from all the circumstances surrounding the overt act. But if two witnesses are not required to prove treasonable intent, two witnesses need not be required to show the treasonable character of the overt act. For proof of treasonable intent in the doing of the overt act necessarily involves proof that the accused committed the overt act with the knowledge or understanding of its treasonable character.
The requirement of an overt act is to make certain a treasonable project has moved from the realm of thought into the realm of action. That requirement is undeniably met in the present case, as it was in the case of Cramer.
The Cramer case departed from those rules when it held that ‘The two-witness principle is to interdict imputation of incriminating acts to the accused by circumstantial evidence or by the testimony of a single witness.' 325 U.S. at 35. The present decision is truer to the constitutional definition of treason when it forsakes that test and holds that an act, quite innocent on its face, does not need two witnesses to be transformed into a incriminating one. 12
The Kawakita Case

Kawakita v. United States13 was decided on June 2, 1952. The facts are sufficiently stated in the following headnote: At petitioner's trial for treason, it appeared that originally he was a native-born citizen of the United States and also a national of Japan by reason of Japanese parentage and law. While a minor, he took the oath of allegiance to the United States; went to Japan for a visit on an American passport; and was prevented by the outbreak of war from returning to this country. During the war, he reached his majority in Japan; changed his registration from American to Japanese, showed sympathy with Japan and hostility to the United States; served as a civilian employee of a private corporation producing war materials for Japan; and brutally abused American prisoners of war who were forced to work there. After Japan's surrender, he registered as an American citizen; swore that he was an American citizen and had not done various acts amounting to expatriation; and returned to this country on an American passport. The question whether, on this record, Kawakita had intended to renounce American citizenship, said the Court, in sustaining conviction, was peculiarly one for the jury and their verdict that he had not so intended was based on sufficient evidence. An American citizen, it continued, owes allegiance to the United States wherever he may reside, and dual nationality does not alter the situation.14
Doubtful State of the Law of Treason Today

The vacillation of Chief Justice Marshall between the Bollman15 and Burr16 cases and the vacillation of the Court in the Cramer17 and Haupt18 cases leave the law of treason in a somewhat doubtful condition. The difficulties created by Burr have been obviated to a considerable extent through the punishment of acts ordinarily treasonable in nature under a different label,19 within a formula provided by Chief Justice Marshall himself in Bollman. The passage reads: Crimes so atrocious as those which have for their object the subversion by violence of those laws and those institutions which have been ordained in order to secure the peace and happiness of society, are not to escape punishment, because they have not ripened into treason. The wisdom of the legislature is competent to provide for the case; and the framers of our Constitution . . . must have conceived it more safe that punishment in such cases should be ordained by general laws, formed upon deliberation, under the influence of no resentments, and without knowing on whom they were to operate, than that it should be inflicted under the influence of those passions which the occasion seldom fails to excite, and which a flexible definition of the crime, or a construction which would render it flexible, might bring into operation.20

Topics

• Citizenship
• Prisoners
• Supreme Court
• War

Footnotes

1. Jump to essay-18 U.S. (4 Cr.) 75 (1807).
2. Jump to essay-28 U.S. at 126.
3. Jump to essay-38 U.S. at 127.
4. Jump to essay-4United States v. Burr, 8 U.S. (4 Cr.) 469, Appx. (1807).
5. Jump to essay-5There have been lower court cases in which convictions were obtained. As a result of the Whiskey Rebellion, convictions of treason were obtained on the basis of the ruling that forcible resistance to the enforcement of the revenue laws was a constructive levying of war. United States v. Vigol, 29 F. Cas. 376 (No. 16621) (C.C.D. Pa. 1795); United States v. Mitchell, 26 F. Cas. 1277 (No. 15788) (C.C.D. Pa. 1795). After conviction, the defendants were pardoned. See also for the same ruling in a different situation the Case of Fries, 9 F. Cas. 826, 924 (Nos. 5126, 5127) (C.C.D. Pa. 1799, 1800). The defendant was again pardoned after conviction. About a half century later participation in forcible resistance to the Fugitive Slave Law was held not to be a constructive levying of war. United States v. Hanway, 26 F. Cas. 105 (No. 15299) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1851). Although the United States Government regarded the activities of the Confederate States as a levying of war, the President by Amnesty Proclamation of December 25, 1868, pardoned all those who had participated on the southern side in the Civil War. In applying the Captured and Abandoned Property Act of 1863 (12 Stat. 820) in a civil proceeding, the Court declared that the foundation of the Confederacy was treason against the United States. Sprott v. United States, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 459 (1875). See also Hanauer v. Doane, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 342 (1871); Thorington v. Smith, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 1 (1869); Young v. United States, 97 U.S. 39 (1878). These four cases bring in the concept of adhering to the enemy and giving him aid and comfort, but these are not criminal cases and deal with attempts to recover property under the Captured and Abandoned Property Act by persons who claimed that they had given no aid or comfort to the enemy. These cases are not, therefore, an interpretation of the Constitution.
6. Jump to essay-6325 U.S. 1 (1945).
7. Jump to essay-789 Law. Ed. 1443-1444 (Argument of Counsel).
8. Jump to essay-8325 U.S. at 35.
9. Jump to essay-9325 U.S. at 34–35. Earlier, Justice Jackson had declared that this phase of treason consists of two elements: adherence to the enemy; and rendering him aid and comfort. A citizen, it was said, may take actions which do aid and comfort the enemy . . . but if there is no adherence to the enemy in this, if there is no intent to betray, there is no treason. Id. at 29. Justice Jackson states erroneously that the requirement of two witnesses to the same overt act was an original invention of the Convention of 1787. Actually it comes from the British Treason Trials Act of 1695. 7 Wm. III, c.3.
10. Jump to essay-10330 U.S. 631 (1947).
11. Jump to essay-11330 U.S. at 635–36.
12. Jump to essay-12330 U.S. at 645–46. Justice Douglas cites no cases for these propositions. Justice Murphy in a solitary dissent stated: But the act of providing shelter was of the type that might naturally arise out of petitioner's relationship to his son, as the Court recognizes. By its very nature, therefore, it is a non-treasonous act. That is true even when the act is viewed in light of all the surrounding circumstances. All that can be said is that the problem of whether it was motivated by treasonous or non-treasonous factors is left in doubt. It is therefore not an overt act of treason, regardless of how unlawful it might otherwise be. Id. at 649.
13. Jump to essay-13343 U.S. 717 (1952).
14. Jump to essay-14343 U.S. at 732. For citations in the subject of dual nationality, see id. at 723 n.2. Three dissenters asserted that Kawakita's conduct in Japan clearly showed he was consistently demonstrating his allegiance to Japan. As a matter of law, he expatriated himself as well as that can be done. Id. at 746.
15. Jump to essay-15Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cr.) 75 (1807).
16. Jump to essay-16United States v. Burr, 8 U.S. (4 Cr.) 469 (1807).
17. Jump to essay-17Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1 (1945).
18. Jump to essay-18Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631 (1947).
19. Jump to essay-19Cf. United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583 (2d. Cir. 1952), cert denied, 344 U.S. 889 (1952), holding that in a prosecution under the Espionage Act for giving aid to a country, not an enemy, an offense distinct from treason, neither the two-witness rule nor the requirement as to the overt act is applicable.
20. Jump to essay-20Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cr.) 75, 126, 127 (1807). Justice Frankfurter appended to his opinion in Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 25 n.38 (1945), a list taken from the government's brief of all the cases prior to Cramer in which construction of the Treason Clause was involved. The same list, updated, appears in J. Hurst, supra at 260-67. Professor Hurst was responsible for the historical research underlying the government's brief in Cramer.

ledge to comment. Originally Posted by oeb11

Covid might have been an act of war. Stealing the election with the help of China could have been an act of war. We might be at war with China.

i think china is long since at economic war with America - and a political One as well.

That is not a declared State of War declared by Congress.

will teh pelosi/schumer fiden axis declare a shooting State fo War on China - not at this moment.
They have payments to receive.

two traitors were executed in the 1950's, the Rosenburgs. USA wasn't at war with the late Soviet Union, but a cold war was in effect tho.


so, don't need a declared war to execute some one for treason.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Julius...thel_Rosenberg





Espionage

Julius Rosenberg joined the Army Signal Corps Engineering Laboratories at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey in 1940, where he worked as an engineer-inspector until 1945. He was fired when the U.S. Army discovered his previous membership in the Communist Party. Important research on electronics, communications, radar and guided missile controls was undertaken at Fort Monmouth during World War II.[9]
According to a 2001 book by his former handler Alexander Feklisov, Rosenberg was originally recruited to spy for the interior ministry of the Soviet Union, NKVD, on Labor Day 1942 by former spymaster Semyon Semyonov.[10] By this time, following the invasion by Nazi Germany in June 1941, the Soviet Union had become an ally of the western powers, which included the United States after Pearl Harbor. Rosenberg had been introduced to Semyonov by Bernard Schuster, a high-ranking member of the Communist Party USA and NKVD liaison for Earl Browder. After Semyonov was recalled to Moscow in 1944 his duties were taken over by Feklisov.[10]
Rosenberg provided thousands of classified reports from Emerson Radio, including a complete proximity fuse. Under Feklisov's administration, Rosenberg recruited sympathetic individuals into NKVD service, including Joel Barr, Alfred Sarant, William Perl, and Morton Sobell, also an engineer.[11] Perl supplied Feklisov, under Rosenberg's direction, with thousands of documents from the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, including a complete set of design and production drawings for Lockheed's P-80 Shooting Star, the first U.S. operational jet fighter. Feklisov learned through Rosenberg that Ethel's brother David Greenglass was working on the top-secret Manhattan Project at the Los Alamos National Laboratory; he directed Julius to recruit Greenglass.[10]
In February 1944, Rosenberg succeeded in recruiting a second source of Manhattan Project information, engineer Russell McNutt, who worked on designs for the plants at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. For this success Rosenberg received a $100 bonus. McNutt's employment provided access to secrets about processes for manufacturing weapons-grade uranium.[12][13]
The USSR and the U.S. were allies during World War II, but the Americans did not share information with, or seek assistance from, the Soviet Union regarding the Manhattan Project. The West was shocked by the speed with which the Soviets were able to stage their first nuclear test, "Joe 1", on August 29, 1949.[14]



rosenbergs committed espionage for teh russians during WW11.

espionage during a time of War - is treason.



regardless of teh name of teh offense - I believe Milley committed sedition - it is still a very serious charge and should put him in prison for Life!

well aiding the enemy ,,,,,,,,,,,? remember they not hiding China first

what milley did was not treason, but sedition.


he deliberately undermined Trump. for this, he should be court martialed, charged with sedition, reduced to rank, and fired.


as a joint chief staff, he did not have statutory authority to do what he did.

They are trying to ignore as normal when its inconvenient ,

what milley did was not treason, but sedition.


he deliberately undermined Trump. for this, he should be court martialed, charged with sedition, reduced to rank, and fired.


as a joint chief staff, he did not have statutory authority to do what he did. Originally Posted by dilbert firestorm

Agreed DF

Glad to see someone understands the Constitution and its' definitions of treason and sedition.

They conspired to defy the commander and chief? Both?

They conspired to defy the commander and chief? Both? Originally Posted by eccieuser9500

its most likely a typo, commander in chief. looks like spellcheck fucked up BB.