i don't buy the "asleep at the switch" theory. we had the Ford sitting on their doorstep, and Trump on the phone with Maduro asking him to step down. they were on high alert. nor do i buy the "junior officer" theory. a junior officer might make less than perfect decisions, but even an ensign is not going to do absolutely nothing to mount a counteroffensive in that scenario. to me the evidence suggests that whatever we did involved the wholesale incapacitation of whatever defenses Venezuela would have expected to muster in such a brazen, frontal assault that the US brought to bear. it looked like they lost all battlespace eyes and ears. the best they could do was shoot at what they could see in front of them. hence the Chinook damage and the few injuries. we had total situational awareness of the battlespace; they had none.
i think that a failure to fully implement a Russian defensive network an earlier poster mentioned-i think it was txdot-is entirely plausible. if the network was in fact fully operational, no one in China nor Russia is safe from an American "intervention", anytime, anywhere..
how does the same fuckery happen-failure of an entire Russian defensive network-twice, once in Iran and once in Venezuela? seems like a bit too much of a coincidence. my guess is the U.S. has a reliable workaround, but what that workaround is, i can only guess.
as to resources needed, any actual conflagration in the South China Sea, East China Sea, or Taiwan Strait is, by definition, an "all-in" affair. as Master Yoda would say, "there is no try". Alex Honnold would concur in his record-breaking free solo of El Cap..
Russia's "Fearsome Arsenal" fizzled in the Midnight Hammer raid on Iran too.
Do not be mistaken in thinking that Russia's stuff doesn't work . . .it does.
My takeaway is that while any Anti-Air network of systems can be overwhelmed or saturated to the point that it becomes ineffective. . . .but it takes a lot resourcers and effort.
Another factor is lack or training or experience on the part of operators on duty n Zero-Dark whatever. The same goes for junior and senior leadership; are they on the ball? Can they be misdirected into ineffective action?
One thing that concerns me is the intensity of action and density of resources required to accomplish this sort of thing both in Venezuela and I ran.
What level of effor, what scope of action will it take to control the sealanes around the Phillipenes, Korea and Japan?
Originally Posted by ICU 812