Shelby Foote did quite a bit of the narrative on The Civil War series that ran on PBS a few years back that was produced by Ken Burns. he has a "matter of fact" way of putting things.
JD, Lee also failed to heed the advice of his Artillery Commander, Porter Alexander. Alexander told him that there were delays in getting re-supplied after the bombardment, and he should not send in the Infantry without Artillery support. Lee sent them anyway, knowing that Jeb Stuart's Calvary was coming around the rear. Of course, as was pointed out, Stuart never made it either.
In General Pickett's memoirs, he stated his absolute distain for what Lee did with the words, "That old man destroyed my Division".
Originally Posted by Jackie S
As part of Lee’s advance into Pennsylvania, the Second Battle of Winchester was fought: 13 – 15 June, 1863. In that battle, Confederate forces successfully stormed and carried fortified positions. Union losses numbered 4,443. Confederate losses numbered 269. The Confederates enjoyed a numerical advantage of slightly less than 2 to 1; hence, substantially less than the 3 to 1 advantage put forth in military doctrine.
Lee struck the Union right hard on July 1st. On July 2nd, he hit the Union left hard. On July 3rd, 1863, Lee incorrectly believed Meade – btw, this was Lee’s first encounter with Meade – would have adjusted his forces to reinforce his left and right flanks; thus, leaving the center weak. Furthermore, as stated by you and others earlier, Lee depended on Stuart’s cavalry and Colonel Alexander’s two-hour artillery barrage to ‘soften’ Meade’s center. Fact is, Meade did not make those adjustments, and both Stuart’s cavalry and Alexander’s artillery barrage also failed to make a dent.
BTW, Lee knew he lacked supplies. That was one of the factors that necessitated the attack. Colonel Alexander informed Longstreet that his batteries had limited ammunition to support the fatal charge. When Longstreet directed Alexander to secure more ammunition, Alexander explained that that action would cause a delay enabling the Union to recover, prepare and reinforce against the impending Confederate infantry attack.
With the enabling factor of hindsight, one might reason Longstreet was probably ‘more’ correct in recommending a defensive action, such as the Confederates conducted at Fredericksburg. However, Lee – per Douglas Southall Freeman – knew his force couldn’t remain in position and wait for Meade to press an attack much more than a day without better logistical support. Lee also knew any attempt by his force to disengage from Meade’s army without first bloodying its nose would result in fighting-footrace to the Potomac: a fighting-footrace the Confederates might well lose.
Lee’s soldiers did cross the wheat field, and they did gain the wall. They were just not strong enough to capture and hold the position. Lee met the retreat telling the men it was his fault – not theirs.