Since flghtr65 consistently jumps behind other people's arguments, specifically the 29 scientists and engineers that sent a letter to White House supporting in the deal, I'm going to dismantle their letter.
flghtr65's scientists and engineers: As scientists and engineers with understanding of the physics and technology of nuclear power and of nuclear weapons,
As scientists and engineers hailing mainly from bastions of radical left wing sought, with no understanding of the complete variables involved with what the agreement is trying to resolve, they could only speak for nuclear theory. Without tactical or operational knowledge, they did not factor in real-world variables that makes it easy for the Iranians to cheat the deal.
Referring to these people as "credible" and as "subject matter experts" in this agreement is like referencing people, who make ice cream, in an agreement that's supposed to implement prohibition on ice cream.
Q. How do you keep people from making ice cream?
A. Well, if you restrict ice cream to ice cream factory A, and only monitor for specific type of ice cream being made, you will have a good deal in your hands.
Narrator: Nothing mentioned about people being able to make ice can from scratch.
They could only speak for the technical aspects of what's needed to create a new weapon, they cannot speak for the totality of the reality surrounding the Iranian nuclear power program. Especially variables that would frustrate the deal.
flghtr65's scientists and engineers: we congratulate you and your team on the successful completion of the negotiations in Vienna.
They're congratulating him only because they favor who the president is, as well as his initiatives. Anybody reading the deal would see the Iranians made out like bandits. Saying that this was a successful completion of negotiations is like a buyer describing his purchase of a $500.00 plain toilet bowl lid from a shrewd dealer as a "successful purchase."
Had a Republican came up with this agreement, I highly doubt that many of these scientists and engineers would've been equally congratulatory.
flghtr65's scientists and engineers: We consider that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) the United States and its partners negotiated with Iran will advance the cause of peace and security in the Middle East
The JCPOA is no different from any other inspection team when it comes to inspecting compliance with a treaty intended to prohibit a country from detonating a nuclear bomb. Those in the past did not advance the cause of peace and security anymore than JCPOA would in Iran.
It's like what I mentioned earlier, the Soviets cheated on every treaty that they had with us. Yes, there was an inspection regimen, but that did not stop the Soviets from being able to cheat their agreement.
The North Koreans were able to cheat the agreement, the Iraqis before them cheated a similar agreement, and the Iranians will cheat this specific agreement.
flghtr65's scientists and engineers: and can serve as a guidepost for future non-*proliferation agreements.
How could it serve as a guidepost for future nonproliferation agreements, when it's similar in concept to the agreements made with regarding to North Korea and their nuclear program, and to Iraq with their WMD program?
When it comes to this agreement, I see similar concepts, and similar opportunities for the Iranians to circumvent it to get what they want.
This agreement "all but gave the Iranians the kitchen sink." A nuclear treaty, designed to curb nuclear weapons but not peaceful nuclear use, is a weak treaty. This is not a guidepost, unless you want future agreements that favor the offending/errant country as the new norm.
flghtr65's scientists and engineers: This is an innovative agreement, with much more stringent constraints than any previously negotiated non-*proliferation framework.
Wrong. Where areas other similar agreements to this restricted the offending programs altogether, this one allows the Iranians to continue with a nuclear program. This includes enrichment. The Iraqis had to dismantle their WMD program. The North Koreans had to freeze their nuclear program, with the view that they will be dismantled in the future.
flghtr65's scientists and engineers: It limits the level of enrichment of the uranium that Iran can produce, the amount of enriched uranium it can stockpile, and the number and kinds of centrifuges it can develop and operate.
First, why is there even a process for the Iranians to even be able to enrich or stockpile uranium? Why are they even allowed to maintain centrifuges, let alone be able to develop and operate such?
This does not sound like a restriction, but a consideration not necessarily offered under similar agreements.
Again, this is contingent on the Iranians being 100% honest about what they have and disclosing everything. That's not going to happen. The Iranians are going to cheat that deal from the get-go, whatever provisions are in that agreement are useless.
flghtr65's scientists and engineers: The agreement bans reconversion and reprocessing of reactor fuel,
For the known sites. The Iranians would be "willingly" cooperative in this area, but not at any undeclared area. They will continue to cheat in that area. You can monitor selected sites all you want, that's not going to catch activities at sites that the Iranians will keep under wraps.
This will ban reconversion and reprocessing as much is underage drinking laws will ban underage drinking.
flghtr65's scientists and engineers: it requires Iran to redesign its Arak research reactor to produce far less plutonium than the original design,
If Jane was required to redesign her stove to not be able to cook certain items, she would do so knowing full well that the community doesn't know about her other oven. This concept applies here.
This deal, for it to work, would have to be one where the Arak research reactor is the only reactor that they have. This is based on what the Iranians were willing to admit to. So, the Iranians will not apply this to research reactors that they do not declare.
flghtr65's scientists and engineers: and specifies that spent fuel must be shipped out of the country without the plutonium being separated and before any significant quantity can be accumulated.
The inspectors will monitor limited areas where the Iranians would be in position to collect and ship this material out. However, in other areas that the international community does not know about, the Iranians will continue doing this regardless what inspectors are doing elsewhere.
If the sites come under inspector suspicion, the process laid out in the written agreement would kick in. The amount of time that Iran will be able to delay, and the amount of time that would be bought by the conflict resolution hierarchy, would allow the Iranians to move this operation elsewhere before finally agreeing to allowing the inspectors in.
flghtr65's scientists and engineers: A key result of these restrictions is that it would take Iran many months to enrich uranium for a weapon.
Read the whole statement, then the statement that I highlighted in red. Why do I highlight this in red? The answer is simple. This key phrase, highlighted in red, destroys everything else that these scientists and engineers say in their letter.
The only way that this agreement would be "unprecedented" is if you're looking at "unprecedented" in terms of an agreement that DOES NOT prohibit Iran from getting the nuclear weapon.
The scientists lay out their technical knowledge about what Iran has to do, as well as all of these things that is going to make it hard for Iran to get a nuclear weapon. Then, they end up saying this. What use is anything in the agreement, if the Iranians still will be able to produce a nuclear weapon?
This alone is an indicator that the Iranians made off like bandits.
Even your scientists and engineers indicate that it'd take months to make a nuclear weapon, because of this deal.
flghtr65's scientists and engineers: We contrast this with the situation before the interim
agreement was negotiated in Lausanne: at that time Iran had accumulated enough 20 percent enriched uranium that the required additional enrichment time for weapons use was only a few weeks.
This is an arbitrary number, as they are basing this off news reports of what the Iranians have disclosed, and of reports of what is suspected that they have. This is not based on what the Iranians know they have but the international community does not know they have.
Hypothetically, Iran could've been invaded, and we could very well not have turned up any evidence that they were even close to getting off the ground with their nuclear program.
But, this displays a theme of the scientists and engineers letter. They are praising what they feel is Iran's delay in being able to get a nuclear weapon. LOL, weeks instead of months! They are not praising the accomplishment of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty "stopping" yet "another one."
Like you, and your allies on this thread, the scientists and engineers take on the "hope we get eaten last" approach. Iran's supreme leader continues to make bellicose statements against Israel and United States.
If you guys trust the Iranians, and the rest of the Iranian government, to make this agreement work, that's on you guys.
flghtr65's scientists and engineers: The JCPOA also provides for innovative approaches to verification, including monitoring of uranium mining, milling, and conversion to hexafluoride. Centrifuge manufacturing and R&D will be monitored as well.
Based on the reading of the text of the agreement, there's nothing "innovative" when it comes to verification. The means of verification here are not that much different from the means of verifications for similar agreements in the past.
The agreement, the way it is written, authorizes Iran to mine for uranium. No mention, in the agreement, that milling is prohibited.
The text of the agreement mentions "monitor" but does not specify details of how this monitoring will be done, or the extent of what technologies will be used. They will monitor what the international community knows, what Iran wants to admit to.
flghtr65's scientists and engineers: For 15 years the Natanz facility will be the only location where uranium enrichment is allowed to take place and it will be outfitted with real-*time monitoring to assure rapid notice of any violation.
Assuming that this is the only place that the Iranians will conduct uranium enrichment. They could monitor the Natanz facility all they want, it will not do them any good with regards to monitoring other areas that the Iranians do not want to disclose.
flghtr65's scientists and engineers: The authority is provided for real-*time monitoring of spent fuel as well.
Known spent fuel, not unknown spent fuel. And, if the Iranians decide to turn off monitoring at the known locations, there is a conflict resolution hierarchy that has to kick in before sanctions are re-implemented.
Like I said before, re-implementing sanctions at this point would be useless. Without the previous sanctions in place, any new sanctions would be a joke to the Iranians, as the removal of the sanctions allows Iranians to get back to where they were before the first sanctions were imposed.
flghtr65's scientists and engineers: Concerns about clandestine activities in Iran are greatly mitigated by the dispute resolution mechanism built into the agreement. The 24-*day cap on any delay to access is unprecedented, and will allow effective challenge inspection for the suspected activities of greatest concern: clandestine enrichment, construction of reprocessing or reconversion facilities, and implosion tests using uranium.
WRONG. The dispute resolution, as written in the agreement, does nothing to mitigate, in any degree, Iran's clandestine activities.
Notwithstanding any "deadline" for the inspectors to check any suspected clandestine activities, one resolution process begins with a 15 day process, followed by another 15 day process at the next higher level of resolution. This is a month on top of any delays that the Iranians are able to commit to that's built into the agreement.
This is more than enough time for the Iranians to move anything, materials and activity, from a site that the inspectors have suspicions about.
The Iranians have an X amount of days to respond to that challenge. Somewhere in the agreement, it lists 20 + days. The conflict resolution wouldn't start until the drop dead date. We're looking at Iran having a month and a half to move materials and activities if a suspected site happens to have these materials and activities.
flghtr65's scientists and engineers: The approach to resolving "Possible Military Dimensions" is innovative as well:
From the agreement:
"In line with normal international safeguards practice, such requests will not be aimed at interfering with Iranian military or other national security activities, but will be exclusively for resolving concerns regarding fulfilment of the JCPOA commitments and Iran's other non-proliferation and safeguards obligations."
No, I don't see anything "innovative" here. This is the only area in the agreement where "military" is mentioned. This opens the door for the Iranians to pull the "military and national security" card to frustrate inspections. The paragraph that includes this statement is not specific enough to remove any doubt as to the inspectors being able to come in and inspect.
Now, they could say we could do this for inspection purposes. The Iranians could wait until the deadline, then start the conflict resolution process. Again, they would have enough time to move the materials and activities before finally letting inspectors in.
flghtr65's scientists and engineers: the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) must be satisfied that it is fully informed about any previous activities, in order to guide its future verification plans, but Iran need not be publicly shamed.
This is your scientists and engineers touching up on what I talked about. Key here is the need for the Iranians to fully disclose their nuclear program infrastructure. If they do not do that, the inspectors would only have what the Iranians admit to work with. Even your scientists admit, through this wording, that for this agreement to be successful, the Iranians have to be honest and not cheat.
Without that honesty, without the full disclosure, whatever planning comes afterward will not be effective.
flghtr65's scientists and engineers: This agreement, also for the first time, explicitly bans nuclear weapons R&D, rather than only their manufacture as specified in the text of the Non-*Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
The agreement that we had with North Korea also banned nuclear weapons. So no, this isn't a first. Unlike the case with North Korea, where they had to freeze their program, the Iranians are allowed to continue enriching uranium and do other related research.
Yeah, it's a first alright, a first that allowed the errant nation to go ahead and continue nuclear related activities.
flghtr65's scientists and engineers: Some have expressed concern that the deal will free Iran to develop nuclear weapons without constraint after ten years.
The real criticism involves the fact that the Iranians do not need to start phasing out its centrifuges until 10 years after the agreement. Also, number of years, but which Iran could get a nuclear weapon, are arbitrary numbers being thrown around.
The agreement, as a means to eliminate Iran's ability to generate a nuclear weapon, is weak. Just like the North Koreans, the Iranians could visibly detonate a nuclear bomb while the agreement is in place.
flghtr65's scientists and engineers: In contrast we find that the deal includes important long-*term verification procedures that last until 2040, and others that last indefinitely under the NPT and its Additional Protocol.
The scientists said "months" and not "years." But, wait, what do we have here? They're insinuating that this would not happen till 2040, or never at all. Which is it? The scientists and engineers that you referenced can't even make up their minds. Like I said earlier, these numbers are arbitrary.
Actually, using the "constraints" listed in the agreement, assuming that the Iranians do exactly what they're supposed to do per the agreement, Iran would feasibly be able to create a nuclear weapon after 25 years. However, the success of the agreement hinges heavily on the Iranians being honest, and disclosing everything. If they don't, then they could develop a nuclear weapon "on schedule" regardless of what the agreement says.
flghtr65's scientists and engineers: On the other hand, we do believe that it would be valuable to strengthen these durable international institutions.
The international institutions that these guys talk about are not going to be strengthened. We're talking about the UN, packed with corrupt countries, sending people to these teams. The United Nations has predominantly been a useless institution compared to what it was put in place for.
These inspections, that will take place in Iran, will be no different from previous inspections.
flghtr65's scientists and engineers: We recommend that your team work with the IAEA to gain agreement to implement some of the key innovations included in the JCPOA into existing safeguards agreements.
If this agreement is "unprecedented" and represents "the first", why is it that we all of a sudden have to get agreement to implement these "innovations"? Once again, the scientists and engineers destroy the main theme of their letter. In their own words, they're showing that this agreement is not truly a "first" or "unprecedented".
If the method of monitoring, and verifying, is what they say this, why are the only wanting to implement "some", vice "all?" More of your scientists and engineers' inconsistency in the same letter.
I did not see anything, in my reading of the agreement, that indicates anything being used to monitor the Iranians, and to check compliance, is going to be anything different from previous similar inspections.
flghtr65's scientists and engineers: This will reduce the proliferation risks associated with national fuel cycle facilities worldwide.
No it wouldn't. Nothing in the agreement effectively addresses the variables that could come into play to make this agreement ineffective. Again, the Iranians have to be 100% honest on what they have. If they aren't, which is what is going to be reality, the risks will not be reduced. Especially if you are not able to apply a 100% blockade on Iran. The text of the agreement prohibits such.
flghtr65's scientists and engineers: Thus in the future, when Iran is treated the same as all non-*nuclear weapons states with nuclear energy programs, all such programs will be more stringently constrained and verified.
Not necessarily. Other countries were promised peaceful nuclear energy technologies in exchange for them not forging ahead with their nuclear weapon program. The Iranians are allowed to generate it themselves, with the help of other countries.
With the Russians getting involved with increasing ties with Iran, the Iranian ability to do this plan clandestinely skyrockets.
flghtr65's scientists and engineers: As you have stated, this deal does not take any options off the table for you or any future president.
Odumba is all talk and no action. Don't expect any military action should Iran cheat on the deal, or move forward with a nuclear weapon program. Even the only real weapon that they have, sanctions, will lose their effectiveness. Re-imposing sanctions, after they have been lifted and the Iranians already benefited from international trade, would not be as effective as they would have been had the sanctions remained in place.
The Iranians will cheat, they will not suffer any real consequences.
flghtr65's scientists and engineers: Indeed it will make it much easier for you or a future president to know if and when Iran heads for a bomb, and the detection of a significant violation of this agreement will provide strong, internationally supported justification for intervention.
With the way the agreement is written, no, Odumba and his successors would not be able to know if the Iranians shift gear and go full speed ahead with nuclear weapon development. That is, until they see preparations for test site, followed by subsequent nuclear detonation.
These scientists and engineers are putting too much faith in the Iranians being honest and 100% truthful. They are also placing all their stock on the assumption that everything covered in the agreement is all that Iran has.
flghtr65's scientists and engineers: In conclusion, we congratulate you and your team on negotiating a technically sound, stringent and innovative deal that will provide the necessary assurance in the coming decade and more that Iran is not developing nuclear weapons, and provides a basis for further initiatives to raise the barriers to nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and around the globe.
BWAAAAAAHAAAAAAHAAAAAA! Am I done yet? HAAAAAAHAAAAAAHAA!
They are so blatantly biased, and plainly liberal, that they should just have come out and said that any deal from their golden guy would be a great deal simply because it was an initiative of their golden guy.
This was one of the worst deals that we could come up with regards to requiring the other side to make as much sacrifices to come to center as we did. Nope, that's not what happened. Had this deal been any worse, there would've been provisions in the agreement for the United States to ship kitchen sinks to Iran.
This deal is not technically sound, stringent, or innovative at all. The deal, as written, provides no assurance against Iran developing a nuclear weapon. Heck, even the scientists said something about being able to make a nuclear weapon in months. The deal, as written, is a dictator's dream if he were to try to develop nuclear weapons.
This agreement does nothing to raise the barriers over the previous agreements. This agreement is more generous than the other agreements, and has loopholes big enough for trucks to go through.
Now, time to analyze the people that signed this letter. Flghtr65 keeps hiding behind these scientists and engineers instead of advancing his own arguments. He keeps harping about their letter as if it was gospel, and that everybody should just stand down because of what these guys say.
A look at their backgrounds indicate that these scientists and engineers are predominantly liberals/progressives. Look at their university affiliations below. Universities are hotbeds for left-wing ideology. It's only natural that Obama will get his support from tenured professors at these universities, as well as heavily Democrat counties.
The Union of Concerned Scientists embraces the factually deficient man-made global warming theory. They support initiatives against this non-existent threat. We are actually in a cooling period, and it's about to get colder. So, the Union of Concerned Scientists are in the liberal camp.
I found another guy, who signed this, who was in the White House staff for Jimmy Carter. See the trend?
As you go through their letter, they provide little information that would require the background. Much of their letter is opinion, and blows steam up Odumba's azz. These guys are liberal hacks that want to set up their golden guy to look good. Critical thinkers would think otherwise.
Scientists and engineers supporting Obama's agreement:
Sincerely,
Richard L. Garwin, IBM Fellow Emeritus [Opposes spread of nuclear weapon knowledge, regardless of how flowed the agreement to do that is.]
Robert J. Goldston, Princeton University
R. Scott Kemp, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Rush Holt, American Association for the Advancement of Science
Frank von Hippel, Princeton University
3
Also signed by:
John F. Ahearne, Director, Ethics Program at Sigma Xi, The Scientific Research Society [President Carter's White House Staff]
Philip W. Anderson, Professor Emeritus, [Princeton University]
Christopher Chyba, [Princeton University]
Leon N. Cooper, [Brown University]
Pierce S. Corden, Former Director, Office of International Security Negotiations, Bureau of Arms Control: Department of State
John M. Cornwall, Professor of Physics and Astronomy, [UCLA]
Sidney D. Drell, [Stanford University]
Freeman Dyson, Professor Emeritus, Institute for Advanced Study, [Princeton University]
Harold A. Feiveson, [Princeton University]
Michael E. Fisher Professor Emeritus, [Cornell University and University of Maryland]
Howard Georgi, [Harvard University]
Sheldon L. Glashow, [Boston University]
Lisbeth Gronlund, [Union of Concerned Scientists]
David Gross, Professor of Theoretical Physics, [Kavli Institute for Theoretical Physics, UCSB]
Sigfried S. Hecker, Center for International Security and Cooperation, [Stanford University]
Martin E. Hellman Professor Emeritus of Electrical Engineering, [Stanford Universit]y
Ernest Henley, [University of Washington]
Gregory Loew, Emeritus Deputy Director and Professor, SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory
C. Kumar N. Patel, Professor Emeritus of Experimental Condensed Matter, [UCLA]
Burton Richter, [Stanford University]
Myriam Sarachik, [City College of New York, CUNY]
Roy F. Schwitters, [The University of Texas at Austin]
Frank Wilczek, [Massachusetts Institute of Technology]
David Wright, [Union of Concerned Scientists]
(Affiliations for identification only)
