The Japanese had all night to ready the first and only 7-minute launch.My original post was never a comparison between what the Japanese did and how the the U.S. did in the same battle, it was merely a statement of fact that the Japanese trained to a high level of proficiency to perform the same kind of mission -- the "Elephant Walk" moving from the staging position to an actual launch -- that was being practiced by the U.S.A.F. in Utah last week. Then along you come with your straw man bullshit.
How did they do on their second try at it?
Looks like all your info came from your memory.
And of course, you lie about the effect your "kernel" had on the battle. None.
The Japanese had 4 decks. The US had 3.
The only 7 minute launch they had was an attack on a fixed position target involving 2/5 of the aircraft you stated. 27 aircraft per carrier. At 4:30 in the morning.
You have no information about how much time it took to get them ready to launch.
Launching in 7 minutes doesn't include any of the staging, arming, or any of the prep work needed to ready a plane to launch. I've included information that shows 50 minutes is @average to ready and launch a strike
The Hornet's planes ran out of fuel because they took the wrong heading from the get-go as well as the long-range to the targets.
None of the planes used excess fuel waiting on large strike groups.
Coming from a well-known nitpicker, this is pretty sad/funny.
You're pissed because you got caught lying. You increased numbers to make a point that had no effect on the battle.
27 planes, all readied to launch from a carrier, took 7 minutes under no battle duress. Big whoop.
You make all manners of assumptions to attempt to prove your point. This is your MO for many posts.
You got caught and then you got mad. Your inner (as well as your outer) child takes over. I live in the real world, not trump-land.
You're a trumpy because you're a lying liar. It's your comfort zone.
The only things you got right were that Yorktown's crew was better trained and that you were wrong about the number of planes in the strike. The Japanese had more experience, not better training.
Japanese training models are inflexible and leave no room for initiative. Anytime they hit something unexpected, they lock up.
See below that they could have had another carrier.
Even during a "rebuttal" that you had plenty of time to check, you lie instead. All that time and still no clue about the Hornet's strike groups issues. You were talking about training and doctrine so that's what you blame.
What a douche-bag.
"During the Battle of the Coral Sea one month earlier, the Japanese light carrier Shōhō had been sunk, while the fleet carrier Shōkaku had been severely damaged by three bomb hits and was in drydock for months of repair. Although the fleet carrier Zuikaku escaped the battle undamaged, she had lost almost half her air group, and was in port in Kure awaiting replacement planes and pilots. That there were none immediately available is attributable to the failure of the IJN crew training program, which already showed signs of being unable to replace losses. Instructors from the Yokosuka Air Corps were employed in an effort to make up the shortfall.[38]
Historians Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully believe that by combining the surviving aircraft and pilots from Shōkaku and Zuikaku, it is likely that Zuikaku could have been equipped with almost a full composite air group. They also note that doing so would have violated Japanese carrier doctrine, which stressed that carriers and their airgroups must train as a single unit (in contrast, American air squadrons were considered interchangeable between carriers). In any case, the Japanese apparently made no serious attempt to get Zuikaku ready for the forthcoming battle.[39]"
"Spruance judged that, though the range was extreme, a strike could succeed and gave the order to launch the attack. He then left Halsey's Chief of Staff, Captain Miles Browning, to work out the details and oversee the launch. The carriers had to launch into the wind, so the light southeasterly breeze would require them to steam away from the Japanese at high speed. Browning therefore suggested a launch time of 07:00, giving the carriers an hour to close on the Japanese at 25 knots (46km/h; 29mph). This would place them at about 155 nautical miles (287km; 178mi) from the Japanese fleet, assuming it did not change course. The first plane took off from Spruance's carriers Enterprise and Hornet a few minutes after 07:00.[85]Fletcher, upon completing his own scouting flights, followed suit at 08:00 from Yorktown.[86]
Fletcher, along with Yorktown's commanding officer, Captain Elliott Buckmaster, and their staffs, had acquired first-hand experience in organizing and launching a full strike against an enemy force in the Coral Sea, but there was no time to pass these lessons on to Enterprise and Hornet which were tasked with launching the first strike.[87]Spruance ordered the striking aircraft to proceed to target immediately, rather than waste time waiting for the strike force to assemble, since neutralizing enemy carriers was the key to the survival of his own task force.[86][87]
While the Japanese were able to launch 108 aircraft in just seven minutes, it took Enterprise and Hornet over an hour to launch 117.[88]Spruance judged that the need to throw something at the enemy as soon as possible was greater than the need to coordinate the attack by aircraft of different types and speeds (fighters, bombers, and torpedo bombers). Accordingly, American squadrons were launched piecemeal and proceeded to the target in several different groups. It was accepted that the lack of coordination would diminish the impact of the American attacks and increase their casualties, but Spruance calculated that this was worthwhile, since keeping the Japanese under aerial attack impaired their ability to launch a counterstrike (Japanese tactics preferred fully constituted attacks), and he gambled that he would find Nagumo with his flight decks at their most vulnerable.[86][87]
American carrier aircraft had difficulty locating the target, despite the positions they had been given. The strike from Hornet, led by Commander Stanhope C. Ring, followed an incorrect heading of 265 degrees rather than the 240 degrees indicated by the contact report. As a result, Air Group Eight's dive bombers missed the Japanese carriers.[89][90]Torpedo Squadron 8(VT-8, from Hornet), led by Lieutenant CommanderJohn C. Waldron, broke formation from Ring and followed the correct heading. The 10F4Fs from Hornet ran out of fuel and had to ditch.[91]"
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Midway
Taken together, it is apparent that spotting a twenty-one-plane strike for launch would take around forty minutes total, and another five to ten minutes would be required for the launch.12 If the deck spot contained dive-bombers, the spotting time would be perhaps five to ten minutes longer, because these planes had to be armed during engine warm up. This timing is directly confirmed in official Japanese sources.13 The need to warm up engines on the flight deck, dictated by Japanese hangar design, reveals itself as a major hindrance to Japanese operational tempos. Unfortunately, warm-up could not be shortened—aircraft casualties were the inevitable outcome of slighting this activity, and needless losses had to be avoided at all costs.14 Thus, if Nagumo was to attack the American strike force, he needed to find an unbroken forty-five-minute window of opportunity on all four flight decks during which to spot and then launch his.
From page 4
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cg...ext=nwc-review
Originally Posted by Munchmasterman
The authors of the book, Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully, cited by the Wiki editor DO make that comparison and note that the Enterprise and Hornet launches were poor in comparison to what the Japanese did while they praised the efficiency of the Yorktown. Maybe be your dumb-ass should ACTUALLY read what Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully wrote rather than try to debate with the Reader's Digest version you see at Wiki.
Just like the Japanese, these three U.S. carriers already had their planes readied and staged on the flight deck. So your notion that the Japanese had some kind of advantage is bullshit.
Your reference to the forty-five minutes Nagumo needed is also bullshit. That forty-five minutes Nagumo needed included the time Nagumo need to land the Midway strike-force that was already in the air and the elevator time to move those returning planes to the hangar decks and then -- AND THEN -- to move all of his readied planes from the hangar decks to the flight decks and then launch them. Your notion that you are comparing apples-to-apples is bullshit.
Furthermore, jackass, the Hornet's planes did splash because they'd been in the air too long. The fighters, which had the shortest turn around time, were launched first and waited an hour for the TBFs and SBDs, which had a longer turn around times. That additional hour of fuel would have gotten most of them home. As it was, all of those fighters splashed. Maybe be your dumb-ass should ACTUALLY read the fucking book rather than try to debate with the Reader's Digest version you see at Wiki.
Regarding Coral Sea, notice how a transfer of aircrews from the Zuikaku to the Shōkaku violated Japanese doctrine and was a command decision and is, therefore, irrelevant in regards to the proficiency of the aircrews at launching. The Japanese could have had four additional carriers for the carrier battle at Midway: five counting the Zuikaku. If your dumb-ass had ACTUALLY read the fucking book rather than try to argue with the Reader's Digest version you see at Wiki, you'd know that.
And none of your bullshit detracts from the fact that training, training, training enabled the Japanese to perform that part of their mission with great proficiency, and similar training, training, training by the U.S.A.F. will give U.S. crews the same degree of proficiency.
