I understand the "necessary to retain top talent" argument and even agree with it to a point, but I have a problem with the short term focus and most of these folks have limited downside risk (downside risk, that is betting their own money). All of the value lost in '08 shouldn't all be forgotten in one bonus cycle.
Originally Posted by atlcomedy
Agreed! Particularly your last point. But let me make a few more:
1) I would be the first to admit there were fundamental flaws in the compensation plans on Wall Street (and on Pine Street, which happens to be where AIG is located.
) They are too short-term focused and have no downside. In the old days, when investment banks were partnerships, those bonuses were largely paid into capital and kept in the firm where it was at risk -- not so in public companies. If banks are to be involved in proprietary trading or securitization (see #2 below) the people doing this business should have a very significant chunk of their bonus re-invested in their own cooking for a minimum of three years -- not restricted stock on the parent -- that doesny have direct downside. It should be invested in
their trading book.
2) IMO, because banks are part of the money system, they have no business engaging in proprietary trading*. Yes, they will miss profits, but they also don't manufacture iPods either and I understand that's a real profitable business. Consider it just a cost of the charter. Securitization is another question. This is where a bank bundles up a bunch of loans (e.g., mortgages) and sells them off to investors. This is one of the problem areas in the meltdown, but a very useful function for the economy. Here, I think they should be allowed to continue this business, but should be required to keep some percentage (e.g., 5%) on their books to ensure credit quality. And the people that run these business units should have a big chunk of their bonuses invested in this stuff. Again, if you have to eat your own cooking, you make better decisions.
3) There are only a few Wall Street banks that survived this meltdown intact. (A better term is actually investment banks.) Most of the biggies are now gone. Even among those that survived, there were more pink slips than in Detroit.
4) Wall Street is not all of banking. There were banks that received TARP funds that had nothing to do with mortgages or trading (e.g., Northern Trust) and didn't need the money, but were pressured to take it. Others that were in no danger failing (e.g., large regional banks) needed it to prevent a bank run. Even if you look at a bank like J.P. Morgan or Bank of America, that has a big involvement in mortgages and investment banking, the vast majority of their employees have absolutely nothing to do with these business. They are tellers and branch managers like you deal with every day. I'd also note that JPM, although involved up to its ears in this mess, was never in any danger of losing money -- they are very well run and had started backing out of the mess almost a year before it cratered.
5) "Our money" did not pay any bonuses. All but one of top ten TARP recipients earned a profit in 2008 and 2009, even with whatever write-offs were necessary on their portfolios. (Surprise, surprise, the one was Citicorp.)
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* That is trading where you take one side or the other of an unmatched book. This is different than just executing a trade for a client.