Ok tiny, I'll try to get back on track here with a few comments. You can expect the frauds and poseurs like Mucus McLame to punctuate our intelligent conversation with semi-literate posts that serve no useful purpose other than to underscore the vast chasm between their phony claims of academic pedigree and their appalling ignorance with respect to every topic under discussion.
1. Regarding Japan, it was one of the first major industrial countries to embark on a course of massive fiscal and monetary stimulus starting in the early 1990s following the collapse of the real estate bubble. Japan was the first to experience large-scale QE and negative interest rates. I've not been able to wrap my brain around the latter. Once interest rates fall to zero or less, you might as well toss traditional rules of prudence to the winds. Government debt is no longer a burden since investors are PAYING to hold it, instead of demanding a real rate of return. (Of course, if deflation - defined as falling prices - is severe enough, investors can still earn a real rate of return despite negative interest yields, but I digress.)
Your question seems to be - how did Japan get away with racking up twice the debt/GDP ratio we have without seriously impairing its international creditworthiness or unleashing runaway inflation? One reason has to do with the country's chronic trade and BoP surpluses. They suck in liquidity and help finance its domestic spending sprees. (Thirty years ago, everyone complained about the need for Japan to reduce its massive trade surpluses - today it's China.) By contrast, the US has run huge trade deficits (rather than surpluses) for decades. As for inflation, not only has Japan avoided a major outburst, it's proven very difficult for the Bank of Japan even to raise the pace of inflation significantly.
For more answers, I would suggest doing a little research on what Milton Friedman and Paul Krugman had to say about Japan's QE efforts. I know Friedman wrote about it before he died in 2006. Krugman did a paper back in 1998 analyzing it through a Keynesian IS-LM "liquidity trap" framework. I hesitate to recommend it since Krugman is an idiot and he has been bragging about that paper ever since it was published 22 years ago, but it might still offer a few useful insights:
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content...uez_rogoff.pdf
Besides the differences in our economic models, there are important cultural and banking differences between the US and Japan which affect any comparisons between their experience and ours. For instance, when Japan's real estate bubble burst in the early 1990s, it took years for the major Japanese banks and other lenders to write down their impaired loans to reflect market reality. They avoided this in part because they were supported by the keiretsu system of interlocking bank-corporate relationships. In the US, we had the opposite problem during the 2008/09 Great Recession. Because of our strict mark-to-market GAAP rules and mentality, our banks were way too quick to write down stricken mortgage-backed assets on their books. (Assets held in the trading inventory rather than the investment account were supposed to be repriced DAILY.) The economic recovery only started after those mark-to-market rules were suspended in Q2 2009.
2. The fact that fraud has run rampant in many of the CARES Act pandemic relief programs was entirely predictable. There are always bad actors out there ready to game the system. You know, dishonest liars like Mucus McLame. In an emergency like the covid shutdown where you need to get money out in a hurry to where it is urgently needed, you can't spend weeks drafting foolproof anti-fraud rules. You have to learn as you go. Rules for the PPP program were changed several times after it was rolled out last April. Because the loans are forgiven if a borrower follows the rules, Mark Cuban called PPP loans the best deal ever invented for small businesses. A lot of stories came out last week about how prison inmates, gang members and other unqualified applicants in California have stolen billions of dollars from the CARES Act unemployment assistance program. I don't think many other states outside of CA, IL and NY experienced such a high level of fraud. Red states administered their portions of the program more carefully and responsibly than blue states that are governed by incompetent dim-retards. No surprise there.
Originally Posted by lustylad
Great post. I never thought about how Japan's trade or current account surplus would enable the country to “rack up twice the debt/GDP ratio we have without seriously impairing its international creditworthiness or unleashing runaway inflation.” That's a little bizarre -- I should have, for reasons I'll explain:
I worked for a multinational in Indonesia during the Asian economic crisis of 1998/1999. So I observed up front and close what happens to a currency and inflation when you combine a current account deficit with large foreign debt (in this case in the private sector) and a crisis of confidence. The Indonesian currency went from 2500 per dollar to 14000 in less than a year, and inflation shot up to over 50%. What Indonesia did with the banks was more along the lines of what you described above in the USA, they shut them down, because the IMF forced them to. The situation was different there though because every tycoon in the country started up his own bank his businesses could borrow from.
Now the reason I said it's "bizarre" is because it never occurred to me, until I read your post, that this would work the opposite way when you've got a current account surplus, and when you own a ton of U.S. dollar and European debt, and the Gaijins (white devils) hold relatively little of your debt. OK, yeah, I've thought about that with respect to forex movements, but not with respect to inflationary pressures.
The Japanese have been huge savers, which as we've discussed goes hand in hand with large current account and trade surpluses. Not only is this going to result in the Japanese owning lots of foreign debt, but that's got to dampen inflation too.
OK, my knowledge of macroeconomics is "0" compared to yours, so I'm probably going to get myself in trouble. The only positive thing I can say is that the professor in my one and only class was maybe even more famous than the prof in your introductory class, who you've mentioned here. Mine literally used to take dictation from LBJ while the president was taking a dump. When LBJ said "I want someone who will kiss my ass in Macy's window and say it smells like roses," he was probably referring to this guy.
Sorry, I digressed. I don't have the background in macroeconomics to understand, if you've got negative interest rates, and negative real interest rates, why don't people borrow as much as they can and why doesn't inflation go to the moon? Even in Japan.
I have actually risked money based on this belief. "100K" seems to be getting thrown around a lot in this thread. Well, I lost over 100K in two or three weeks a few years ago shorting German long term bunds (bonds) when German long term rates were negative. I couldn't figure out what kind of an idiot would pay the government to borrow his money when he could just put a bunch of cash in a safety deposit box instead. Turns out the idiot was me.
I'll take a look at Krugman's paper, thanks. I read the good parts of Capitalism and Freedom, which you recommended, btw.
About pandemic relief fraud, that might have been too strong a word in my earlier post. When they first came out with the Covid loans that would be forgiven provided you continued to employ people, a lot businesses which were 100% solvent and had no intention of laying anyone off took the loans because they were free money. Yes, you've got a good point about getting the money out and circulating. I was really critical of the Bush and Obama administrations for their bailouts in 2008 and 2009, but looking back, I was wrong. They kept people in business and employed and most of the money was paid back.