short comment re. bradley manning

-- not guilty until proven otherwise

-- don't think as stupid as a Judith Miller, but rather smart as a Robert Novak
(wikileaks has many redundant checks in place. a wikileak never consists of material from a single source. (single source would make the system way too easy to compromise)

-- material is from siprnet. feel free to tell me how many have access? or should i tell you?

made a lapus in the post above, changed to not guilty.

really so many eyeballs are on bradley manning, but few seem to notice the real scandal within the system

-- not guilty until proven otherwise Originally Posted by ..

True enough. Even the Army hasn’t announced that it is ready to proceed with a Court Martial, but when (if) it does, there is over 90% chance Manning will be convicted. The Army tends to prosecute only those cases it knows it will win.

-- material is from siprnet. feel free to tell me how many have access? or should i tell you? Originally Posted by ..

Beaucoup! Beaucoup!

Also extremely unlikely that a PFC had that much access to the system. There have to be accomplices.

Also extremely unlikely that a PFC had that much access to the system. There have to be accomplices. Originally Posted by pjorourke

Perhaps, but one of the issues is that over the last decade almost all diplomatic traffic got put on a network that could be used for low levels of classification AND access control was not particularly thought out. So, in general an accomplice would be a safe bet but in this case who knows.

Also extremely unlikely that a PFC had that much access to the system. There have to be accomplices. Originally Posted by pjorourke

Apparently not. This stuff was posted on DoD computers for relatively low level military personnel to use. Shows it really wasn't very secret.

Also extremely unlikely that a PFC had that much access to the system. There have to be accomplices. Originally Posted by pjorourke

Probably had help but it depends on how he took the stuff & what his job was...

If his job gave him relatively unsupervised access to the subnet all that traffic traveled on....he throws a snort on it & directs copies of the packets he's looking for to an out of the way corner of the subnet & then burns it to cd/dvd. Or one a few other ways.

This stuff was posted on DoD computers for relatively low level military personnel to use. Shows it really wasn't very secret. Originally Posted by TexTushHog

You are probably right. Manning probably had at least a SECRET clearance level because he was in Military Intelligence (I know, that's an oxymoron).

As a 96B [Bravo], Intelligence Analyst, he had to “meet TOP SECRET security clearance and Sensitive Compartmented information (SCI) access eligibility requirements,” but that doesn’t mean the Army gave him that level (TOP SECRET) of clearance. The SIPRNet is used to transmit data and reports classified as SECRET and below. The SIPRNet is routinely used to transmit military orders including personal data of military personnel (SSNs, date of birth, etc). This is sensitive information, but not necessarily tactically or strategically important. Literally, thousands of military personnel of all grades have access to SIPRNet.

There were probably officers and NCOs in the room with him, but it probably wasn’t hard for him to avoid direct detection. However, there are digital records (who or what terminal accessed what data, when and how often) that are supposed to be reviewed on a regular basis. Somebody fell down on the job there.

I found this on Wikipedia tonight.

“Manning enlisted in the United States Army at 18, becoming an intelligence analyst deployed in support of the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division at Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq.

“Manning had social difficulties in the Army, which were attributed to the problems of being homosexual under the 'don't ask, don't tell' policy. Before being arrested, Manning had been demoted from Specialist to Private First Class for assaulting another soldier and was scheduled to be discharged early” (Wiki).

If this is true, it appears he was a disgruntled soldier. Since he was busted down, and being processed for early discharge, he probably shouldn’t have had as much access to a computer work station as he did. This is another supervisory failing. Complacent perhaps, but not complicit.

I’ve known men like Manning. These men have above average intelligence, but if they get bored or feel they have been slighted, they retaliate in petty ways. I knew a unit clerk once who habitually “misplaced” (file 13) the shot record books for soldiers, NCOs and officers he did not like. That meant these men had to return to the clinic and receive a whole battery of shots again. BTW, once I found out that this clerk had thrown those records away, I was never again able to trust him working alone.

. BTW, once I found out that this clerk had thrown those records away, I was never again able to trust him working alone. Originally Posted by I B Hankering

Yea but did you ever catch the flu while he was in charge of records?

Yea but did you ever catch the flu while he was in charge of records? Originally Posted by WTF

Lol - I wasn't in the company where he was a clerk. When he transferred to our company, he didn't work in the orderly room with personnel records. Besides, it was the typhoid shot I feared most; that, and novice orderlies with needles.

I knew a doc who was in the Army. When an officer he didn't like would come in for a physical (this was back in the 1960's), he would tell him he suspected he might have hepatitis (which would lead to discharge) and send him for a liver biopsy, which is quite painful. Then, when it came back negative, he'd personally tell him the "good news", but tell him that it needed repeating in six months "just to make sure everything was OK."

Fayetteville (NC) Observer

December 4, 2010

Naval Intelligence Specialist Stationed At Bragg Investigated For Espionage

By James Halpin, Staff writer

A Navy intelligence specialist stationed at Fort Bragg is under investigation for espionage after he allegedly sold top secret documents to an undercover FBI agent posing as a foreign intelligence officer, according to a search warrant filed in federal court on Friday.
The Naval Criminal Investigative Service is investigating Bryan Minkyu Martin, of the Naval Reserve, after several staged buys of intelligence at two Spring Lake hotels.
A search of public records filed in an online federal court database indicated Martin had not yet been charged in connection with the case.
According to the search warrant, filed by Special Agent Richard Puryear with NCIS, Martin enlisted in the Navy on Nov. 30, 2006, and completed basic training on July 20, 2007. He received a top secret clearance on Sept. 20, 2007, and was subsequently stationed with the Navy Reserve unit Defense Intelligence Agency, according to the warrant.
He was assigned to the Joint Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg on Sept. 16 of this year.
Two months later, on Nov. 15, Martin met an undercover FBI agent in the lobby of the Hampton Inn on Bragg Boulevard in Spring Lake, according to the warrant. The special agent, posing as a foreign intelligence officer, brought Martin to his room, where Martin discussed his access to military computer networks and classified networks, according to the warrant.
Martin also told the agent that he was seeking “long-term financial reimbursement,” and that he could be very valuable over a 15- or 20-year career, which he expected would take him to the Defense Intelligence Agency, the warrant says.
Martin offered to bring the agents two documents at their next meeting and accepted $500 in cash from the agent, according to the warrant.
At a meeting the next day at the same hotel, Martin produced two documents - one labelled “secret” and the other “top secret” and accepted $1,500 in cash, the warrant alleges. He agreed to meet the agent again on Nov. 19, when he produced 51 pages of secret and top secret documents, according to the warrant. He was paid another $1,500, according to the warrant.
Martin also failed to report the contacts to any member of his chain of command, according to the warrant.
The warrant authorized NCIS agents to search the room Martin was using on base, Room 315 at the Landmark Inn on Fort Bragg and his 2009 gold Nissan Altima. It does not address how Martin came under suspicion or how he came into contact with the undercover FBI agent.
Martin’s status with the Navy wasn’t immediately known.

http://www.fayobserver.com/articles/2010/12/03/1052893?sac=Home